Special Issue

Josef Ehmer, Jens Ehrhardt, Martin Kohli (Eds.)

**Fertility**

*in the History of the 20th Century: Trends, Theories, Policies, Discourses*

Fertilität

*in der Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts: Trends, Theorien, Politik, Diskurse*

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Editorial

In this special issue, a pluridisciplinary group of scholars – demographers, historians and sociologists – reflect upon the demographic history of the 20th century. They discuss the complex interrelationship among fertility trends, population theories, policies and public discourses, examining a range of European and non-European countries. Whereas the three former fields have been intensely studied in demography and its neighboring disciplines, there is still little work on population discourses, and even less that link them to the trends, theories and policies of population. This volume brings together some of these studies and, by doing so, the editors hope to stimulate the scientific debate on this topic, to raise awareness of its interconnections with population theories and policies, and to contribute to more theoretical integration. Two further concerns motivate this special issue: Firstly, in contrast to widespread fantasies of societal engineering, it highlights the limits of population policies and the autonomous character of cultures of reproduction. Secondly, the volume once more shows that it is indispensable for the understanding of recent demographic patterns and variations to integrate them into long-term historical trends, and to put them into international comparative perspectives.

The special issue is organized in three sections. The first one discusses approaches to the study of fertility across historical periods. Josef Ehmer sets the stage for the other contributions by discussing the *longue durée* of fertility change. He stresses the significance for the understanding of fertility behavior of (post-)modern societies of looking back into pre-modern historical periods. He argues that recognition of similarities and differences among the various historical periods fosters the understanding of contemporary trends. Jens Ehrhardt and Martin Kohli concentrate on an important societal change, one that is often referred to in fertility studies (e.g. with the dichotomy of familialism vs. individualism), but hardly ever systematically discussed – namely, the process of individualization. They discuss its impact on reproductive behavior by focusing on the increasing status of children and women in modern history and on the rising individual autonomy and freedom to make decisions. Particular emphasis is given to the hitherto neglected consequences of the regulation of divorce. Simon Szreter draws conclusions from his long-term interest in empirical studies of and theoretical reflections on the history of fertility and, in particular, of the multiple fertility declines. His aim is to construct a heuristic framework which makes it possible to integrate multi-disciplinary approaches to the history of reproductive change, and he introduces the concept of communication communities to understand the relations between the reproductive behavior of individuals and social groups, as well as their interaction with institutions, ideologies, and politics.
The second section concentrates on discourses and politics and their practical impact on reproductive behavior. From the late 18th century, the public debate on population became more and more dramatic and emotionally loaded. Prior to that, mercantilistic population policy was mainly focused on increasing the numbers; policies were aimed at encouraging immigration and settlement, sometimes even through measures that required tolerance towards ethnic and religious differences. This situation changed with growing population numbers, rising nationalism, and from the middle of the 19th century, the transfer of biological ideas to the social sciences (e.g. Darwinism and eugenics). Through them, the “quality” of the population evolved as a goal and criterion of the population discourse. With the “First Demographic Transition” and its decreasing fertility rates, the new discourse became dominant. Much of it was couched in an “apocalyptic rhetoric” marked by the fear of extinction (Thomas Etzemüller). No other field of the social sciences is characterized by a meta-framing that includes benchmarks such as life, death, health, and disease. Thus, it comes as no surprise that this social field is receptive to radical and extreme responses and suggestions. From the late 19th century, two further closely related trends gained increasing significance: firstly, what German historians call “Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen” (scientification of the social) and, secondly, a growing belief in and desire for social engineering. Both these tendencies led to the rise of demography as a scientific discipline and its close interrelationship with population discourses and politics.

Although there has been much research done on the quantitative dimension of the “First Fertility Decline”, a lack of evidence with respect to its wider cultural context persists. Thomas Etzemüller in his chapter argues that population discourses in the social sciences and humanities as well as in the political and public domain are organized in a particular matrix, which transcends national borders and shows a strong persistence over time. In comparing Germany and Sweden as two different societies and political regimes, he brings out the basic features of the matrix. Sandrine Bertaux concentrates on the long tradition of population studies in France and their particularly close interrelationship with politics. She highlights the strong role of immigration and gender and the function of demographic measures in the French population discourse. She also emphasizes the transfer of ideas between republican France, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Cornelie Usborne looks from a different perspective at German fertility in the first half of the 20th century. She stresses the agency of individuals and particularly of women, who practiced birth control and family planning even if in violation of official rules, policies, and regulations. However, in some periods of Weimar Germany, as Usborne shows, they could rely on sexual advice centers and similar institutions as parts of a popular movement for birth control, and even in Nazi Germany support networks could not be completely suppressed. Gerda Neyer and Laura Bernardi, finally, address how the social understanding of childbearing changes with current medi-
cal advances. They reconstruct the distinction in feminist discourse between biological and social motherhood and examine the impact of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) on recent discourses on reproduction.

The third section of the volume concentrates on recent trends in fertility, mainly in Europe and East Asia. These chapters discuss demographic trends as they are represented in quantitative data, and theoretical approaches towards the understanding of their significance. Ron Lesthaeghe presents an updated, enriched and differentiated version of the theory of the “Second Demographic Transition”, which he (together with Dirk van de Kaa) introduced in the 1980s. Lesthaeghe argues that meanwhile all advanced societies in Europe and elsewhere have witnessed the emergence of demographic characteristics which confirm the basic tenets of this theory. Emiko Ochiai examines the suitability of this concept for the understanding of recent fertility trends in East Asia, which led to “ultra-low fertility” in many countries of this region. She develops a comparative perspective both within the East Asian region and between East Asia and Europe/North America. Her conclusion is that there are not only similarities but also considerable differences due to the “compressed modernity” in East Asia and to the prevalence of specific forms of familialism. In Ochiai’s view, not individualism but familialism is the main force behind the declining and ultra-low fertility in East Asia. Finally, Tomás Sobotka studies the “Eastern European reproductive pattern” that emerged in the period of state socialism, the demographic shock following the upheaval of 1989, and the gradual creation of new living arrangements and fertility structures after the implosion of the Communist regimes. He introduces the concept of “postponement transition” to analyze the relation between period and cohort fertility during the 1990s and early 2000s.

The three articles of this last section stress once more the importance of the wider societal context for the analysis of fertility trends. They put particular emphasis on changes in marriage and cohabitation, family structures and values, and the gendered division of labor. They also pay attention to long-term cultural and socio-economic changes as well as to short-term political transitions and economic cycles, particularly to the periods of economic and monetary crisis of the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, they include in their explanatory framework state policies, particularly family and welfare policies, and the various discourses and value systems they are based on. In addition to these shared approaches, the chapters of this section remind us as well that even a thorough theoretical foundation and a sophisticated research design do not necessarily lead to conclusions evoking universal concurrence. There inevitably remains considerable room for further discussion and research.

This special issue originated at a conference in Berlin in January 2010 that was organized by the Working Group A Future with Children: Fertility and Societal Development. The Working Group was established in 2009 by the German Academy of Natural Sciences Leopoldina and the Berlin-Brandenburg
Academy of Sciences and is funded by the Jacobs Foundation <http://www.bbaw.de/bbaw/Forschung/Forschungsprojekte/Fertilitaet/de/Startseite>. It consists of experts in demography, other social and political sciences (including social history), and medical sciences. Its aim is to prepare state-of-the-art reports on the causes and impacts of historical and present-day variations of fertility and on appropriate policy responses. The editors and authors are grateful to their colleagues for their critical suggestions but of course bear full responsibility for the contents of the present volume.

Berlin, Vienna, Florence, February 2011,
Josef Ehmer, Jens Ehrhardt, Martin Kohli
The Significance of Looking Back: Fertility before the “Fertility Decline”¹

Josef Ehmer

Abstract: »Die Bedeutung des Blicks zurück in die Geschichte: Fertilität vor dem “Geburtenrückgang”«. In this paper, I argue that living with no or few children and low fertility was widespread in pre-industrial societies. After a critical discussion of demographic transition theory and the concept of “natural fertility”, I investigate fertility in early modern Europe. In doing so, I follow the suggestion of “cultural demography” and combine quantitative and qualitative research. I show a great extent and many variations of deliberate birth control before the “fertility decline” took place. This finding should help to see the actual level of fertility as less exceptional and dramatic than it is often claimed.

Keywords: fertility, birth control, early modern period, Europe, Japan, demographic transition theory.

1. Introduction: The Benefit of a Long Historical Perspective

For quite a long time, the prevailing assumption was that there exists a clear dividing line between pre-modern reproductive behavior (with a high number of births) and modern limitation of fertility. Classic manifestations of this point of view are the theories of “demographic transition” and “natural fertility” discussed in greater detail below. Nevertheless, recent research has called into question such dichotomic conceptions. A study of history does not reveal two clear, discrete, homogeneous patterns; instead, human reproduction exhibits a high degree of variability and plasticity. These changing paradigms have given new significance to a long historical perspective on human reproduction. This paper argues that looking back in history makes it easier for us to understand the diversity of fertility, the complexity of its determinants, and to assess cur-

¹ As indicated in the Editorial, the papers in this special volume are the outgrowth of a conference that was organized by a multidisciplinary working group on the subject of fertility. Accordingly, my chapter is not primarily intended for specialists in historical demography or population history, but rather social scientists, biologists, medical scientists and scholars in other disciplines who are doing research on fertility. At the same time, I also hope to contribute to the advancement of this discussion among historians. I would like to express my gratitude to Mel Greenwald for his help with the English version of this paper.

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rent demographic facts and circumstances. It also shields us from the assumption that current circumstances are immutable over the long term, or that future changes in fertility can proceed in one possible direction only – that is, towards further limitation and reduction. From this perspective, the development of human reproduction has been diverse and variable, and its future is open.

The benefit of a long historical perspective concerns, in principle, all historical periods.2 Investigations of human fertility have not been limited to the Modern Age – neither on the individual level nor on the level of entire societies and countries. Anthropological as well as historical studies on the reproductive behavior of peoples of various stages of development have greatly enriched empirical evidence and theoretical reflection. In sum, they show an enormous degree of temporal variation as well as of regional, social and cultural differentiation. Moreover, they indicate that in numerous historical societies and cultures, individual women, men and couples have repeatedly sought to influence their reproduction, both to assure having offspring or to increase their numbers, or, conversely, to avoid procreation or to keep the number of their children low. Of course there are differences among historical epochs and the manifold cultures of our world – with respect to the intentions that human beings pursue; the methods they utilize to promote or prevent pregnancies and births; the effectiveness of these methods; and finally with respect to the statistically quantifiable results of the reproductive behavior of large populations. However, both historical and global comparisons also make it possible to clearly bring out the relativity of the respective current circumstances.

Of course, all historical forms of human reproduction are of interest to us; nevertheless, the so-called early modern period (roughly from the 16th to the 18th century) assumes particular significance. Intensive historical-demographic research on precisely this period has established itself in Europe since the 1950s (Flinn 1981, 1-12). It is based, firstly, on the quantitative evaluation of church registers that have recorded baptisms, marriages and deaths in individual parishes since the 16th and 17th centuries. These data allow scholars to reconstruct reproductive histories of individuals and single families, as well as making it possible to summarize the results and establish groups that differ from one another with respect to social, cultural or regional factors. Secondly, reproductive behavior in the early modern period has also been the subject of cultural historical research (McLaren 1984). The issues of sexuality and reproduction were, in this period, the focus of intensive discourses in religion, philosophy and medicine as well as in jurisprudence, the arts and literature. Furthermore, numerous so-called “ego-documents” such as letters, diaries and the like have come down to us; in them, individual men and woman expressed their views about sexuality, reproduction and contraception. Those who have their

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2 For a recent population history of Europe which covers all historical periods see Bardet and Dupâquier (1997-1999).
say in such compositions are predominantly members of the upper classes. Statements on this subject by men and women of the lower classes, on the other hand, come to us primarily from court records having to do with illegitimate forms of sexuality. Sources of this kind make it possible to reconstruct attitudes about children, what motivated people to reproduce or avoid doing so, and the practices utilized to accomplish their respective aims.

Such cultural-historical approaches were, of course, also developed for later historical phases. They play an increasingly important role for the analysis of the “First Fertility Decline” and the variations of fertility over the 20th century (Gillis, Tilly, and Levine 1992; Szreter 1996). In my opinion, though, what has occurred in the field of demographic analysis of the early modern period is a dialog between quantitative-statistical and cultural-historical approaches to a significantly greater extent than in scholarly research on other historical periods. New methodological approaches to explaining historical fertility trends and variations have been discussed in the field of international historical demography ever since the 1980s. These approaches have been designated as “cultural demography” or “anthropological demography” (Kertzer and Fricke 1997; Greenhalgh 1995). They aim to achieve greater integration of quantitative demography, cultural history and historical anthropology. In research on the early modern period, this intention has been realized to a higher degree, in my view, than in research on earlier or later periods.

These considerations have determined the configuration of the following paper. Firstly, I would like to discuss changing paradigms in the history of fertility over recent decades. Secondly, I will concentrate on the early modern period in order to show the results to which the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches leads.

2. Changing Paradigms in the Historical Study of Fertility

2.1 The Theoretical Tradition: Transition Theory and Natural Fertility

Until well into the 1980s, the idea of using a perspective extending back into pre-modern times for the explanation of modern and contemporary patterns of fertility was virtually inconceivable. Until then, the predominant view among demographers and historians of fertility was a dichotomic perspective that contrasted “pre-modern” and “modern” societies. This dichotomy is manifested particularly clearly in two influential theories. The first is the Theory of Demographic Transition that attempts to interlink the secular declines of fertility and mortality with each other as well as with the global population growth that began in the 18th century, and to describe and explain them as part of a likewise global social modernization process. It thus connects statements on past, present and future demographic developments. Transition means the transition
from an ancient demographic regime to a modern system of population and society (Marschalck 1987, 15).

In recent decades, the theory has been intensively discussed, critiqued and modified. But in spite of all this criticism, it has retained its influence in demographic research as well as on global population policymaking, which is why it continues to be imperative to confront it. This paper argues that a critical distance to transition theory is needed to understand the significance of premodern reproductive behavior. Therefore, the following section starts with a brief look at its origins and contents.

The Theory of Demographic Transition is by no means a homogeneous, closed theoretical construction; rather, it is a corpus of ideas that has been developed since the 1920s by numerous French, British and American authors (Chesnai 1992, 1-9). It is “a set of generalizations about the decline in mortality and fertility that typically accompanies the modernization of a society” (Coale 1986: xix). The term itself was coined in 1945 at the leading demographic research institution in the USA, Princeton University’s Office of Population Research, and this is also where the essential steps leading to its formulation as a general theory were taken (Notestein 1945, 41; Davis 1945). Its essential characteristics can be briefly described. According to the Theory of Demographic Transition, global population development proceeded in three phases. The first phase constituted a sort of “demographic state of nature” (Sokoll 2000, 90) that lasted until the commencement of the transition. Arduous living conditions in this longest period of human history manifested themselves in a high mortality rate, which, in turn – in order for a human population to merely maintain its existing numbers – is said to call for an equally high fertility rate. “Any society having to face the heavy mortality characteristic of the premodern era must have high fertility to survive.” (Notestein 1945, 39). Accordingly, mortality and fertility were said to have achieved a state of near-equilibrium at a high level, which led to stagnation or very slow population growth.

The so-called demographic transition is seen as the second phase. The overall process of modernization, but, most of all, innovations in agriculture, industrialization and progress in the area of hygiene and medicine launched a long-term decline in mortality. Fertility, on the other hand, reacted more slowly to the modernization process; being embedded in religious doctrines, moral precepts, customs, family forms, etc., all of which aimed to achieve high fertility. It remained high despite decreasing mortality, which led to rapid, steep population growth. According to this analysis, a decline in birthrates set in gradually. Under the influence of urban and industrial ways of life and in connection with the rise of individualism, people liberated themselves from “older taboos” (ibid., 41) and developed new concepts of family size and number of offspring. This radical transition led to rational birth control through the use of contraceptive practices.
The result is said to have been adjustment of fertility to modern society’s lower mortality rates and, accordingly, the end of high rates of population growth. A “new demographic balance” (Davis 1945, 5) characterizes the third phase of population development in the Theory of Demographic Transition. In Europe, North America and the West’s other overseas outposts, this phase has already become a reality according to Notestein (1945, 40f.) in the middle of the 20th century. It is purported that this could also be achieved in the not-yet-industrialized parts of the world if their inhabitants implement thoroughgoing modernization in accordance with the Western pattern – in particular, industrialization, urbanization, higher living standards, systems of public education, and political participation (ibid., 52). In summary: The classic Theory of Demographic Transition perceives the pre-transition stage of mankind as a more or less homogeneous period of high fertility.

In the years following World War II, transition theory had an enormous influence on global development policies, as it made reducing fertility integral to the “modernization process” (Conelly 2008, 112). The central idea was to foster the economic and social development of so-called Third World countries, the long-term consequence of which would be, more or less automatically, a reduction of fertility. Demographic research in these countries – above all in East Asia and particularly in Japan – nevertheless showed a reduction of fertility even when this was not preceded by improvements of living standards. Due to these results, Notestein and his colleagues undertook a first fundamental modification of the theory in 1950. Whereas he previously “treated fertility rate as a dependent variable, reflecting a culture’s social and economic development, now he suggested that reducing fertility might be a necessary condition for such development.” (Conelly 2008, 138). This new variant became a basic precept of global population policy over subsequent decades. In demographic research, it engendered new interest in agrarian societies (past and present) with low fertility, and led to increasing weight being attributed to cultural factors for the explanation of fertility.³ Surprisingly, the basic theoretical link between low fertility and modernization was not called into question but rather only stripped of its causality. Low fertility was either a result (the original version) or a precondition (the modification) of modernization. Despite the inherent arbitrariness, the theory retained the “force of generalization” (Kirk 1996, 365).

The second influential dichotomic theory is the theory of “natural fertility” developed in the 1950s by French demographer Louis Henry. His approach as

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³ Ever since, the significance of cultural factors is pointed out in all demographic examinations of the transition theory (see, for example, the results of Coale and Watkins 1986). However, those going about this define culture as one or more variables on the macro level and not as part of the agency of concrete individuals or families as is the case in the cultural demography approach. On this subject, see below.
well was to describe the development from pre-industrial Europe to the 20th century using the terms “natural” and “controlled fertility” (Henry 1961). He defined “natural fertility” as a type of behavior in which a married couple did not intentionally endeavor to limit its number of offspring. He defined “controlled fertility”, on the other hand, as the avoidance of additional births once a particular desired number of children had been reached (Coale 1986, 9). Nevertheless, in the field of historical demographics, the term “natural fertility” is often utilized in a more general sense to designate high and solely biologically limited marital fertility that is regarded as characteristic of pre-industrial and early industrialized societies. Only “the variance in age at first marriage” is said to have “led to different number of births per marriage” (according to the critical remarks in Schlumbohm 1992, 333). Beginning in the 1970s, this biologistic understanding of “natural fertility” was subjected to increasing criticism, which caused many demographers to eschew the term altogether. On the other hand, the very wide spectrum of marital fertility both with and without the use of intentional birth control was precisely what encouraged other – primarily British and American – demographers to retain the term “natural fertility” used in contradistinction to intentional birth control. According to this view, “natural fertility” is defined to include very much behavior-dependent but not intentional variations of fertility (Knodel 1986, 359).

Both the Theory of the Demographic Transition as well as the concept of natural fertility had positive effects on historical-demographic research, above all about Europe. They motivated scholars to conduct numerous empirical studies, mostly of a quantitative-statistical nature. The Theory of the Demographic Transition was closely connected with the Princeton project on European fertility decline (Coale and Waktins 1986). Thanks to this project, we have very detailed insights into the quantitative development of fertility throughout Europe (from the Atlantic to the Urals) from the mid-19th century to about 1960. Moreover, many of the participating demographers also investigated periods even further back in the past and taken a look at the 18th century at least (on the subject of Germany, see, above all, Knodel 1988). The theory of natural fertility has also supplied the motivation for a large number of – likewise quantitative – studies of demographic structures and developments from the 16th to the 19th century. The research group headed by Louis Henry called attention to the importance of church books for the field of historical demography, and developed methods of linking baptism, marriage and death records.

But it has been precisely their great success in inciting empirical research that ultimate led to both theories being increasingly called into question. Since the 1980s, both theories have been at the center of critical discussions. This criticism has to do with two areas. Firstly, a growing body of empirical evidence has been increasingly difficult to reconcile with these theories (Szreter 1993; Ehmer 2004, 118-127). Secondly, the theoretical framework and a quan-
titative-statistical empirical approach have proven to be unsuitable for the investigation of new issues related to people’s modes of behavior and attitudes.

As to the first area: Of the many points of criticism, the most important has to do with the “intellectual construct of two stable states” before and after the “transition” (Gehrmann 2000, 164). With respect to the early modern period, the latest research findings have raised doubts about the purported balance between fertility and mortality, and generally about the assumption of a stable demographic structure. The population history of England – the European case on which the most comprehensive research has been done – exhibits violent fluctuations in fertility, mortality and population growth from the 16th to the 18th century. They lead to the conclusion that we must proceed under the assumption of shifting demographic conditions for the time prior to 1780 as well, which contradict the conventional conception of a more or less constant, ‘naturally developing’ as it were, initial demographic level prevailing in pre-industrial times (Gehrmann and Sokoll 2000, 187).

This implies criticism of “homeostatic” or “auto-regulative” pre-industrial population models, which have a long tradition, particularly in German population history (Fertig 2000; Schlumbohm 1996; Gehrmann 2000, 168f.). Apparently, a sustainable balance between mortality and fertility has not emerged in the post-transitional phase either; what occurred instead was a temporary rise in fertility during the so-called baby boom after World War II, followed by a renewed decline to a lower level in the “Second Demographic Transition.” The Theory of Natural Fertility – even when applied in an explicitly non-biologistic way – has been criticized as well. Besides the wide variation of fertility patterns, there is simply too much evidence of intentional birth control in pre-modern societies.5

2.2 New Cultural Historical Approaches

As an alternative to the traditional great narratives, new methodological approaches to explaining historical fertility trends and variations have been discussed in the field of international historical demography even since the 1980s. These approaches have been designated as “cultural demography” or “anthropological demography”. In the field of history, the so-called “cultural turn” in the 1970s led to a stronger influence of cultural history and historical anthropology as opposed to – or in combination with – social history and social science history.

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4 See the papers on this subject in the third section of this special volume. Research on the postwar baby boom, one of the few examples of a completely unexpected and massive increase in birthrates during the 20th century, is, however, insufficient to date.

5 For a critique, see the following paragraphs of this chapter, and the paper by Bertaux in this special issue.
These new approaches proceed from the assumption that fertility and its changes over time are the outcome of decisions made by individuals – single women and men as well as couples – and that these decisions are, in turn, based upon their respective cultural orientation and the degree of social latitude of their actions. These approaches constitute, in my view, a very promising complement or supplement to quantitative-statistical demography. They attempt to place the wish to have children and fertility behavior into a broad social and cultural context that includes such factors as concepts of masculinity and femininity, marital power structures, concepts of the life course, intergenerational relations and the like. They also make an intentional effort to put an end to fertility research’s fixation on women and to address the influence of men and inter-gender relations on fertility behavior. Since these approaches have explicitly called into question the Theory of Demographic Transition, they emphasize the diversity of fertility regimes and especially of so-called “cultures of contraception” (Gillis, Tilly, and Levine 1992) in social, regional and cultural respects in pre-industrial as well as modern societies. The use of highly aggregated demographic indices is indispensable for the analysis of trends; on the other hand, it risks obscuring the diversity of fertility patterns.

In order to illustrate this development, I would like to set up an ideal-typical juxtaposition of two approaches to the European fertility decline based on two seminal and supremely influential books. The first one is Coale and Watkins (1986), which summarizes the results of the Princeton project that is a classic example of population studies and social science history. The second is Gillis, Tilly, and Levine (1992), which has been something like a flagship of new cultural approaches. What are the differences? I see them on six levels: (1) in the research interests; (2) in the understanding of historical change; (3) in the conceptualization of demographic behavior; (4) in the preference for particular historical sources and data; (5) in the range of analysis; (6) and finally in the methods and means of analysis. On each of these levels, the approaches are quite different. I would like to present these differences rather roughly in a wood-cut like style, but my intention is, of course, to take both of them seriously and not to caricature them (see below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research interests in classical population studies:</th>
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<tr>
<td>- understanding the process of the European (later called first) fertility decline 1860-1960 as a whole;</td>
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<td>- building general explanatory models;</td>
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<td>- contributing to global political/economic progress.</td>
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<th>Research interests in cultural history:</th>
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<tr>
<td>- understanding the complexity of human agency;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- understanding individual and group meanings of demographic attitudes and practices;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- understanding the meaning and evaluation of children and particularly of one’s own offspring;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- integrating sexual attitudes and practices into the explanatory framework.</td>
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</table>
Understanding of historical change in classical population studies:
- phase/step concept of historical development;
- 3-step model (traditional society-transition/revolution-modern society, as in the theory of the demographic transition).

Understanding of historical change in cultural history:
- critical versus teleological models;
- questioning transition theory;
- assumption of co-existence of diverse demographic patterns or “cultures of contraception” in all historical societies;
- shifting of the weight of patterns within societies.

Conceptualization of demographic behaviour in classical population studies:
- demographic behaviour as an element of demographic, socio-economic and cultural structures (such as mortality patterns, labour force participation, education, etc.).

Conceptualization of demographic behaviour in cultural history:
- demographic behavior as part of individual and family strategies, kinship networks, gender roles/identities;
- images of maternity and paternity;
- marital power relations, networks of communication, life course expectations.

Historical sources/data in classical population studies:
- quantitative sources;
- census data or census like listings on the national or provincial level;
- sources which provide access to the effects of demographic practices of masses of people or of entire populations.

Historical sources/data in cultural history:
- qualitative sources;
- letters, diaries, reports;
- oral history interviews;
- anthropological field research;
- sources which provide access to the attitudes of individuals or small social groups.

Means of analysis in classical population studies:
- statistical;
- strict research design, testing hypotheses, precise definition demographic indices and variables;
- contextualisation of findings in limited/controlled universe of pre-defined variables.

Means of analysis in cultural history:
- hermeneutic;
- free and explorative research design;
- contextualisation of findings in an open universe.

Spatial and temporal range of analysis in classical population studies:
- pan-European and/or international;
- comparisons across times and cultures;
- particular emphasis on modern societies.

Spatial and temporal range of analysis in cultural history:
- case studies;
- local, regional, social groups;
- individual families
- open to all historical periods.

So much for a brief look at these two paradigms. In the history of fertility, there was certainly no replacement of the social scientific paradigm by the cultural historical paradigm. Rather, there developed various forms of conflict, compe-
tition, and also peaceful coexistence, but not that much real cooperation in empirical research, so far. It will be one of the major tasks of future research to develop productive forms of cooperation. In respect on the early modern period, as stated above, there seems to already be greater integration of quantitative demography, cultural history and historical anthropology. One of the reasons for this is presumably that early modern quantifying studies as well display a micro-historical dimension in that they are based on church books that record the births, marriages and deaths of individual people. The tension between particular case and generalization, between individual and group, is likewise present in these quantitative historical sources just as it is in most so-called qualitative sources.

3. The Myth of High Fertility in Pre-Industrial Societies

Classic theories of demographic development perceived the pre-transition stage of mankind – which covers almost the whole of world history to date – as a more or less homogeneous period of high fertility. The following section of this chapter argues that the assumption of high fertility before the Industrial Revolution of the 19th Century is questionable for various reasons. In Western, Northern and Central Europe, the regions for which the best data is available to us, fertility was rather low in pre-modern times. The number of surviving children per family was even considerably lower. My point in this digression into pre-modern times is to relativize the low fertility of the 20th century. In the past, living with few or no children was nothing out of the ordinary. This argument makes use mainly of quantitative evidence of historical-demographic studies on early modern Europe. I am relying on the results of many studies generated since the 1950s, and using the methods of family reconstitution – that is, linking up birth, marriage and burial registers in single parishes, which make it possible to construct vital histories of individuals and of their demographic behavior, and to aggregate individual and family data on the parish level (Flinn 1981, 1-12).

These studies show that the number of offspring per woman or couple is an extraordinarily variable magnitude that is influenced by a whole series of factors. First of all, we must keep in mind that although puberty and menopause constitute biological caesuras in the life course, they display very high variability throughout history and among different societies. The onset of puberty was relatively late in pre-industrial European societies; later in the lower classes than in the upper classes, later in Eastern Europe than in the West. This indicates that puberty is influenced by the state of economic development and especially by the standard of living. A girl from an urban laborer or rural peas-

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6 On this issue, also see the paper by Simon Szreter in this special issue.
ant family in the 16th or 17th century reached sexual maturity at approximately age 16-18, whereas the onset of puberty is at about age 12 in Western Europe today (Laslett 1971). As for menopause, the same process took place in the opposite direction, moving increasingly beyond age 40 over the course of history. Nevertheless, historical demography has demonstrated that the biological phase of fertility is of limited significance in European history. Social factors play the decisive role.

Firstly, there are rules and norms that link the right to engage in sexuality and reproduction with a particular social status, marital status and age. In Christian Europe during the medieval and early modern periods, marriage was deemed to be the sole legitimate setting for procreation. At the same time, matrimony was subject to certain conditions. In the early modern period in Western, Northern and Central Europe, there emerged a marital pattern that bound marriage to economic independence and the capability of establishing one's own household separate from that of one's parents. The consequence of this was a high age at first marriage – among brides, the average age was 25-27; the average groom was even a couple of years older. A considerable proportion of men and women – at times up to 20% – remained single and childless their whole lives. European Marriage Pattern was the designation given to this in historical demography. A contrasting pattern was to be found in many regions of Eastern and Southern Europe, where women married at a much younger age, usually under 20 (Flinn 1981, 27f.; Bardet/Dupâquier 1998, 490). Naturally, in pre-modern Europe, young people and young adults strove to engage in sexual relations. But, in doing so, they sought to avoid pregnancies, or, if a woman got pregnant nevertheless, they married before the baby’s birth. In fact, in most regions of pre-industrial Europe, the rate of out-of-wedlock births was extraordinarily low.

Secondly, marital fertility also varied greatly. Even when the spouses continually cohabited and regularly had sexual relations, the intervals between births differed. While a mother breastfed her baby, she thereby considerably delayed conceiving again. Above all, however, many married couples did not constantly live together. The high degree of mobility in pre-modern Europe – first and foremost due to labor migration – resulted in many spouses being temporarily separated for longer or shorter periods. To this can be added the high level of mortality, which dissolved marriages due to the death of husbands or wives. Even if remarriage was frequent (above all on the part of men), death meant the interruption of marital life. Finally, consideration must be given to the irregular and dramatically fluctuating food supply and the frequent epidemics. Crop failures led to famines, and people who are hungry, malnourished or sick have a diminished capacity or readiness to bear children (Flinn 1981, 24-46).

All of these factors led to high variability in marital fertility. In Germany, one extremely striking characteristic is the high regional variability. Marital
fertility in East Frisian villages was barely two-thirds the rate prevailing in Swabian and Bavarian communities. Indeed, there were also astounding differences in fertility within a single region or among neighboring villages (Knodel 1988, 372). The explanation of regional variability is not altogether clear. Extremes of very high or low fertility are usually explained with reference to the practice of breastfeeding, which delayed the onset of a woman’s ability to conceive again after the previous birth, and can thereby considerably increase the interval between births (ibid., 251). Presumably, infants in Northern Germany were more often breastfed or nourished this way for a longer period than in the South. The parallel differences in infant mortality point to this interconnection, although scholarly knowledge about regional breastfeeding practices is still very sketchy. The task of explaining differences in fertility becomes even more difficult when we consider that they manifest themselves not only in polarized extremes but across an entire spectrum with fluid transitions.

Social differences in fertility are more difficult to register and summarize. The prevailing opinion tends toward the view that in the early modern period and even into the 19th century, social variability of fertility in Germany was low (Knodel 1988, 296). In other words, the major differences were among villages and regions, whereas within a particular village – even if it displayed considerable socioeconomic inequality – astoundingly uniform fertility behavior prevailed (Knodel 1986, 387). Nevertheless, studies of several villages suggest that marital fertility in the families that made up the peasant upper class was higher than in those of the lower social strata in rural areas. Indeed, this was most probably primarily the result of socially divergent marital age. Since men in the village’s upper class generally married younger brides than did men who were members of the rural underclass, their wives gave birth to more children over the course of a marriage. In areas where higher marital fertility overlapped with a low age at first marriage, one, two or even three more children were born to upper-class families than to those of the underclass). Though caution is certainly still mandated here, one can nevertheless proceed from the general assumption that rural society in Germany displayed socially differentiated fertility and a “positive correlation between the number of offspring and wealth” (Gehrmann 2000, 237).

Is it possible, despite this great variability, to nevertheless generalize about the level of fertility in pre-modern Europe? In my opinion, several generalizations are possible. If the mean age at first marriage was around 25 and the mean age at birth of the last child was around 40, the reproductive span available to women was about 15 years. Since many marriages were terminated by death of the husband or wife before the end of the reproductive period, however, in practice the span was even lower. In 18th-century Lyon, for instance, the mean was about 12 years; in a couple of parishes in 18th-century Sweden, it was 15 years for peasant wives but only 12 years for the wives of landless agricultural laborers. Similar differences between the upper and lower classes of early
modern European societies can be found in many other regions as well. In addition, the birth intervals were surprisingly high, and they lengthened with increasing parity: something like 2 or 2½ years between the first and the second birth, up to 3½ years or even more for higher parities. Therefore, for an average married woman, it was not possible to have more than 5 or 6 births, and where the age at first marriage rose to 28 or 29, at least one potential birth would be lost. Aggregated data for England in the period 1750-1779 give a Completed Fertility Rate (CFR) for married women of 5.0 (Hinde 2003, 225-226). In addition, one has to keep in mind that not all women married. Figures between 10 and 20 percent of never-marrying women were common in many early modern European regions, particularly in Central Europe. Again, there is some evidence that women of the landless rural population married later and less frequently than women of the peasant class.

A very important though often neglected point is the limited significance of fertility for reproduction in pre-modern societies. Of at least equal importance was the high infant and child mortality (Vögele 2007, 2010). Here as well, the regional and social differences were very great (as indicated above using the example of breastfeeding). If one were to nevertheless dare to make a bold generalization, then on average one might say that broadly one quarter of infants failed to survive the first year of life, and another quarter the next 9 to 14 years. The average marriage, therefore, would at best produce 2½ to 3 children that survived to adulthood. In pre-modern societies, the birthrate is a measure of fertility but certainly not of reproduction. About 30 years ago, Tony Wrigley estimated that 20 percent of all couples in pre-industrial Europe would have no surviving heirs, and another 20 percent only one (Wrigley 1978).

Such generalizations of the quantitative dimension of pre-modern European fertility are very rough, of course. Historical reality, in contrast, was dominated by differences, fluctuations and variations. Regional, local and social fertility levels were influenced by demographic conditions such as age at marriage and proportions never marrying, by illegitimacy, premarital conception and the like, and they were also influenced by external factors such as wars, famines, epidemics, various forms of occupation or labor migration and, last but not least, by whether or not breastfeeding was practiced. Nevertheless, if we take infant and child mortality into consideration, then we get a much different picture of pre-modern human reproduction than if we had restricted our focus to birth rates. Two to three surviving children per married couple, and a significant portion of the population who remained lifelong childless singles is a set of facts and circumstances that does not differ so very much from that which prevailed after the first fertility decline.

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7 Rising intervals for higher parities is also part of the ‘natural fertility’ model.
4. Deliberate Control of Reproduction

There are many quantitative and qualitative studies on the subject of early modern birth control in Europe. To an increasing extent, the two approaches are also comingled in the same study (Jütte 2003, 94-101). Initial evidence pointing to restriction of births was provided by quantitative studies, the results of which deviated from the expected model of “natural fertility” and this deviation was interpreted as an indicator of birth control being practiced. Most works on this subject deal with marital fertility control. Quantitative indicators of this are, first of all, long and parity-related (i.e. increasing with the number of children) intervals between births (cf. Gehrmann 2007, 99f.). Examples are to be found in such disparate social milieus as 18th-century Hungarian villages (Santow 1995, 28) and the City of Zürich from the 16th to the early 19th centuries (Pfister 1985). The frequently observed lengthening of the interval between births from the 16th to the 19th centuries is, accordingly, interpreted as due to proliferation of the practice of birth control.

An additional indicator is the age of women at last birth. In Zürich between 1580 and 1819, for example, this figure decreased from age 41.4 to 34.7 (Pfister 1985, 93). This is regarded as evidence of “stopping” – i.e. avoiding additional pregnancies after the birth of a specific number of children. Quantitative procedures enable scholars to show that members of certain social groups pursued the aim of limiting their number of offspring – for instance, the German aristocracy at least from the 18th century on (Schröter 2007). To sum up: It has been demonstrated by quantitative research that birth control was practiced by married couples in various social groups – for instance in France and England by the aristocracy and by segments of the urban bourgeoisie as well. But there were also rural regions and peasant societies that display clear evidence of a “one-child system,” such as the above-mentioned villages in Southern Hungary in the 18th century.

Despite this concentration of research on the limitation of marital fertility, we cannot rule out that late marriage or dispensing with matrimony altogether was also motivated by the desire to have fewer children or none at all. After all, it is well known that abstaining from marriage as a means of birth control played a key role in the population theory of Malthus, for whom it constituted a “preventive check” to limit human fertility in contradistinction to the “positive check” of mortality catastrophes. In his 1798 “Essay on the Principle of Population,” Malthus put forth numerous arguments as to why it would be advantageous for members of various social classes to forego marriage and offspring. For example: “The labourer who earns eighteen pence a day, and lives with some degree of comfort as a single man, will hesitate a little before he divides that pittance among four or five, which seems to be just sufficient for one” (Szreter and Garret 2000, 51). From this, Simon Szreter and Eidildh Garrett conclude that
both to Malthus and to the popular culture, reproduction and the burden of too many children were matters of conscious consideration in late-eighteenth-century English society; fertility was well within the sphere of conscious calculation... (ibid.).

In their well-known seminal study of “The Population History of England: 1541-1871”, Wrigley and Schofield (1981) established a connection between workers’ salaries and age at first marriage: when pay increases, people married earlier; when it decreases, they married later. In this period, England was already a developed market economy in which people could have adjusted their marital behavior – and thus their number of offspring – to business cycle developments. But the limitation of marital fertility could have also followed this pattern. Data on Germany from about 1760 to 1850 suggest postponement of births during economic crises. Just such a pattern of behavior can be imputed above all to those married couples who had not (yet) lost any children (Gehrmann 2007, 96-99).

Such statistical results take on added weight as they are also supported to an increasing extent by the conclusions of cultural-historical research. There is a considerable body of writing on the limitation of family size and of the number of children from the 16th to the 19th centuries. Angus McLaren (1984) was one of the first historians to examine fertility in the pre-modern era from a comprehensive cultural-historical perspective. The discourses on birth control were diverse and conflicting. They included many voices attacking and condemning such practices (which, of course, can also be taken as testimony to how widespread they were). Christian sexual morals in particular held carnal relations not intended for procreation to be a sin. However, the discourses also included defenses of contraception. From this great abundance of contemporary statements, McLaren (1984, 62-64) derived four motivations for practicing birth control. One chief argument was that people engaged in sexual intercourse primarily for pleasure and not procreation. A second argument in favor of birth control was that it would spare the wife an endless series of pregnancies. A third argument was of a financial nature: the problem of providing a dowry for numerous daughters or, in society’s lower strata, to even provide sufficient food and clothing for a large number of children. A fourth argument emphasized the numerous problems that children could cause: illnesses, accidents and the like, and the not inconsiderable risk of thanklessness and rebellion against their own parents.

Sparing women from having to undergo serial pregnancy seems to have been a prime consideration widespread far beyond pre-modern England in the discourses on birth control and the corresponding practices. There is evidence for the existence of taboos prohibiting sexual intercourse with a nursing mother – even if she breastfed her baby for several years – in numerous historical and contemporary cultures. They are said to be predicated on protecting both mother and infant (Santow 1995, 24-26). It was, first and foremost, women
themselves who could reduce the risk of getting pregnant again by extending the period in which they breastfed their baby. A contemporary account about the wife of a German pastor in the mid-18th century reported that because she dreaded frequent puerperium like the devil (though she had already spent considerable time in postpartum repose), it was her practice to breastfeed her children uncommonly long. Schack (her son, J.E.) was two years old and almost all of his 32 teeth had already come in, but he was still drinking mother’s milk (Schlumbohm 1983, 24).

All these examples give abundant evidence of the use of deliberate birth control in the early modern period. Indeed, preventing pregnancy was even more important for single women than for married ones. The above-mentioned low rates of illegitimacy in most parts of Europe in the early modern period have been interpreted as evidence that contraceptive practices were being used. Adolescents and young adults – who, perhaps, did not marry until they were 30 or even older – did engage in premarital sex, and they knew about and used techniques to prevent pregnancy. However, low rates of illegitimacy were also the upshot of a form of “matchmaking” whereby a premarital pregnancy led to nuptials just prior to delivery. On the basis of his examination of English data from the 16th to the 18th centuries, Peter Laslett estimated that 20-60% of all conceptions were extramarital (Laslett 1980, 54-55). Pregnancies and births out of wedlock were viewed negatively in the early modern period and subjected to social sanctions. Single mothers were punished in various ways. Historical scholars have beheld the persecution of these women in numerous qualitative sources – primarily transcripts of legal proceedings held since the 16th century in which officials interrogated unmarried pregnant women or single mothers, actual or purported fathers, and witnesses. These sources reveal that people of all social classes were relatively well informed about the facts of life and about contraception – even if this enlightenment was also frequently mixed together with myths. This included comprehension of the workings of the menstrual cycle, coitus interruptus (withdrawal), etc.¹ It can be assumed that these insights gained in premarital carnal knowledge also had an impact later on marital sexual relations. Presumably, once they wedded, most couples dispensed with using such methods, but these were available if needed.

I am unable to go into great detail here about the birth control methods that were known and used in the early modern period. Suffice it to say that there were three main sets of practices: Firstly, knowledge of contraceptive methods was available, and there is a lot of empirical evidence that these methods were indeed utilized; secondly, if they failed, abortion was widely practiced; thirdly, turning children over to such institutions as foundling hospitals or practicing infanticide were means used to eliminate offspring or to keep their number low.

¹ For a wide range of examples from a remote rural Alpine region in 18th-century Austria, see Becker (1990).
Widespread methods of birth control included abstinence and coitus interruptus, but there were other means of contraception as well (Jütte 2003; Santow 1995). The condom came into use from the 16th century onwards (though they did not become widespread until the 19th century), first as a prophylactic device to prevent syphilis but increasingly as a means of contraception. Condoms were made of linen, sheep gut or the small intestines of other animals, leather and other materials. Other contraceptive devices included contraceptive sponges soaked in lemon juice, slices of lemon, beeswax or certain resins that a woman inserted into her vagina. However, since empirical evidence of such practices stems from local or regional studies, it is impossible to say how widespread knowledge of them actually was, and whether they belonged to specific “communication communities” and not to others. Certainly, none of these methods was 100% infallible. But even in the present day, the Pearl Index that measures the effectiveness of various means of contraception indicates great discrepancies between theoretical and practical effectiveness that result from, for instance, incorrect application. Even if most methods of birth control in the early modern period were not absolutely reliable, couples could at least succeed in lengthening birth intervals.

Several contraceptive substances made from plants were used to perform abortions, which were prohibited in early modern Europe (Leibrock-Plehn 1993). Nevertheless, there is a large body of medical literature discussing the abortifacient properties of certain plants, herbs, etc. In the 16th century, more and more such books were published in various European vernaculars and in ever-larger print runs. This could well have been connected to the legal prosecution of abortion, since these substances were officially classified as medicines permissible for the treatment of pathological amenorrhea or fetal death. Of the more than 100 such herbal remedies prescribed in 16th-century German medical sources, approximately a quarter have been confirmed as effective by modern science (Leibrock-Plehn 1993, 81). They were for sale in pharmacies; other dealers included quack healers, herbalists and midwives. Moreover, knowledge about abortion-inducing substances was passed on from older women to girls and disseminated in social networks. In addition to such plants, there were also certain physical movements or stresses that were said to induce discharge of the embryo, as well as magical means (such as the wearing of a snakeskin). In spite of these practices being outlawed, they were rarely exposed (Stukenbrock 1993). Often, men were the driving force behind an abortion in that they talked the woman they had gotten pregnant into aborting, obtained the abortion-inducing substance, or established contact with an abortionist.

In judicial proceedings, infanticide played a considerably more significant role since a pregnancy followed by the infant’s disappearance was harder to conceal. Most of the defendants were single mothers who, either through neglect or some intentional act, allegedly killed their newborn babies. Married women, on the other hand, could avail themselves of the possibility of giving
birth to their unwanted child in normal fashion and then doing away with it over the following weeks through intentional endangerment or malnourishment. Such practices rarely came to trial since, in light of the high rate of infant mortality prevailing in any case, it was difficult to draw the line between an unintentional fatality and murder with knowledge aforethought, and premeditation could rarely be proved. Despite all the evidence, there is widespread agreement in the literature that infanticide was not a mass phenomenon in the early modern period in Europe; rather, it tended to be associated with particular social stresses and mental burdens placed on single mothers (Ulbricht 1990). In addition to legal prosecution, infanticide was religiously and socially stigmatized – although perpetrators and accessories used as an exculpatory pleading the religious argument that this was a means of conveying innocent children directly to Heaven (Schulte 1989; Ulbrich 1990, 92-207).

However, there was also a legitimate form of de-facto killing of children: the foundling hospitals that, beginning in the 15th century, were established in certain European cities such as Florence. A large number of such institutions were set up in the late 18th century, above all in large metropolitan areas but increasingly in middle-size cities too. They made it possible for single mothers or married parents to give away their unwanted newborns, usually anonymously. The official purpose of foundling hospitals was to prevent infanticide. De facto, however, the rate of mortality among those placed in their care was extremely high – 80-90% of the infants admitted subsequently died – so that even 18th-century contemporaries referred to such facilities as “murder pits” (Ulbricht 1984, 214). The foundling hospital of a major city served, above all, single mothers in the surrounding region. For example, 41% of all children born in Vienna in 1856 ended up in a foundling hospital, where approximately 80% of them died.

One essential characteristic of birth control in early modern Europe was that it was practiced in the upper as well as the lower strata of the social hierarchy, though, indeed, for different reasons and with varying results. Let’s look first at Europe’s most privileged elites. Since the economically or politically dominant social groups were small and genealogically well documented, we have available to us a series of studies on both local and national levels about their biological reproduction and demographic development. S. Ryan Johansson (1987) summarized the most important of these studies from the period from about 1500-1900. His major result is that there was a reproduction level below the replacement level both of families and whole local or national elite classes, which led to their more or less continuous contraction throughout the early modern period. If the elites remained numerically stable or even grew in num-

9 Among the elite families or populations that he investigated were the British peerage, the Florentine and Venetian patriciate, the bourgeoisie of Geneva and Holland, and the ruling families of various European states. For the original sources, see Johansson (1987).
bers, than only by admitting new members to their ranks and integrating those who had climbed the social ladder. According to Johansson, the main motivation for low fertility in these social groups was status anxiety and the avoidance of downward mobility. This involved “a strong commitment among married couples to the preservation of the material basis of their own high social status and to the transmission of that status to their children” (Johansson 1987, 463). Their major means were, firstly, reducing marital fertility, and, secondly, restricting marriage of their surviving children to only one or two of them, while the others remained bachelors or spinsters, accepted church positions or entered monasteries. In Christian and particularly in Catholic Europe, lifelong celibacy was culturally esteemed.

On the other end of the social spectrum we find unmarried young women, most of them agricultural laborers or domestic servants, who were involved in short-lived or long-term pre-marital sexual relationships. If it was improbable or impossible that this sexual relationship would lead to marriage or if it was not even desirable, then they sought to avoid pregnancy or to terminate it via abortion. In the worst case, a newborn infant could be killed, set out to die of exposure, or turned over to a foundling hospital, which was virtually tantamount to a death sentence. The motives for doing so were the consequences of an extramarital pregnancy or birth for both the mothers and their children. Single mothers risked censure or fine by the legal authorities, and were frequently subjected to ridicule and discrimination by the local community. For female servants, getting pregnant or having a child out of wedlock meant loss of employment (and also, as a rule, loss of lodgings). Frequently, they were forced to leave the local area where they lived and worked, which also meant being torn out of their social network. Illegitimate children were subjected to social discrimination and had far fewer opportunities to make good in life than did children born to a married couple. They were much more at risk of infant and child mortality. In many European regions, they were prohibited from taking up crafts and trades (if these were organized in guilds), and were ineligible for citizenship of a city. Between these two poles was a broad spectrum of social positions in which forgoing children or restricting their number could have appeared advantageous and desirable.

In this paper I have been concentrating on early modern Europe. In this final section, however, I would also like to take a brief look at a non-European country, Japan. The population history of pre-industrial Japan long ago attracted the interest of historical demographers (both foreign and domestic), which led to intensive scholarly activity. Despite a few gaps in the research (Saito 1992), wide agreement nevertheless prevails as to the fundamentals of Japanese population history and to long term fertility trends. In the 17th century, the Japanese people was probably the “densest settled population in the world” (Macfarlane 1997, 34) and Edo (later named Tokyo), with approximately a million inhabitants in this period, is considered to have been the “largest city on earth” (ibid.,
In the 18th century, the early modern population growth seems to have ceased, and the population stagnated until the mid-19th century. In this period, Japan’s defining characteristics were high urbanization, small families, and widespread birth control (Hanley and Yamamura 1977, 314). Despite displaying an age at marriage of women (around 20) that was low in comparison to Europe, the level of fertility was rather low, with a completed family size of 3 to 4 children ever born. Means of birth control included early stopping of fertility with last childbirth at 33-35, due to an end of intercourse of married couples. There is evidence that having late babies was regarded as improper, the link between sex and marriage as a cultural norm was weak, and (male) extramarital sex was not seen as sinful (Macfarlane 1997, 306-315). Moreover, birth-intervals were longer than in Europe, comprising typically three years between each child, due to long and universal breastfeeding. A further argument concerns the high work load of Japanese women in agriculture. As a rule, women worked continuously up to birth (and immediately after birth, as well) which often led to fetal losses (Saito 1981). Interestingly, there is no evidence of coitus interruptus or of contraceptives. Abortion, however, is said to have been widely practiced at least since the late 17th century (Hanley and Yamamura 1977), and there is also evidence that "infanticide was unusually prevalent in early modern Japan" (Macfarlane 1997, 333-350, here 347; Saito 1992). "All scholars agree that the Japanese resorted to abortion and infanticide as means of limiting the number of children within marriage…" (Hanley 1991, 698). The Japanese term for infanticide, mabiki, refers to thinning seedlings (Cornell 1996, 34). A widely-used practice was putting a sheet of paper over the mouth and nose of a newborn baby until it would stop breathing. As in other East Asian cultures, this practice was not regarded simply as an act of killing, but of sending back human beings waiting to be born to wait slightly longer until it is their turn once more. In religious cultures where Buddhism, Confucianism and Shinto were blurred, such practices are said not to have been stigmatized (Macfarlane 1997, 333-350). The Japanese example shows once more that deliberate control of fertility in preindustrial times appeared in various cultures and in many variations, and that it was certainly not limited to Europe.10

The general conclusion from all the quantitative and qualitative evidence of birth control before the so-called fertility decline is that having or not having a child was indeed a choice. When women (or men) decided to avoid pregnancy, birth, or rearing a child, they had good chances of finding options conducive to achieving their respective aim.

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10 In spite of the wide agreement among scholars, there is still an ongoing discussion about deliberate control of fertility by individuals through infanticide in early modern Japan, particularly in relation to high infant mortality due to other causes; for discussion see Cornell (1996).
Here, I would like to very briefly go into one last aspect. If, instead of reducing reproduction to biological reproduction, we consider it as social reproduction, we thereby bring up the question of whether parents’ biological children grew up in the parents’ home and, if so, how long. In the family system that prevailed in early modern Western and Central Europe, a widespread practice was to send away even very young children to other families to work – usually as servants – or, conversely, to take in other people’s children. Comparable practices are still in use today in a totally different context in the form of so-called fosterage in rural areas of West Africa (Alber 2004). Explanations of fertility that concentrate exclusively on biological parenthood fall short of presenting a complete picture of many cultures.

5. Conclusion

What is, then, the benefit of a long historical perspective? Certainly, attitudes towards children and the motives for practicing birth control changed considerably during the transition to the Modern Age, and it is undoubtedly true that it is not until this Modern Age that we can properly speak of family planning. Nevertheless, living with very few children and reproduction on a low level that was hardly above the replacement rate were characteristic of many pre-modern societies too. Low levels of reproduction seem to be the rule in history rather than the exception. What I want to bring up for discussion in conjunction with this brief look at the early modern period is whether low fertility following the first and the second demographic transition is perhaps not as extraordinary as it generally appears. We could make an effort to consider the fertility of the recent past and the present not as the endpoint of a developmental process but rather as one of numerous historical variants, and thereby assess them in a way that is somewhat calmer, cooler and more objective.

References


Individualisation and Fertility

Jens Ehrhardt & Martin Kohli*

Abstract: »Individualisierung und Fertilität«. In this paper, we discuss individualisation theory as a parsimonious framework concept to describe and explain core points of fertility change in Western societies since the end of the 19th century. We emphasise two dimensions of individualisation: firstly, the increase in status of the individual in cultural, social, economic and legal respects (human dignity); secondly, the increase in autonomy and freedom of choice. In contrast to other approaches based on individualisation theory, we do not use the concept of self-realisation in the sense of an increased orientation towards purely individual interests, not least because this concept has failed before the renewed rise in fertility that has recently been observed in some advanced societies.

We discuss the relevance of these two dimensions of individualisation in the context of the first transition and the 1960s with its declining fertility rates. Whereas the first demographic transition can be mainly explained by the rising status of children, which increased the costs of parenting and thus changed the interests of (potential) parents to have children, the transition in the 1960s resulted mainly from the rising status of women in education and the labour market. An important but hitherto neglected change was the increasing divorce rates, as the possibility to dissolve a marriage devalued the traditional gender contract of the breadwinner/housewife model and decreased the willingness of women and men to invest in marriage and children.

The contrast between the recently growing fertility rates in Sweden, France and the US with the continuously low fertility in the German-speaking countries can partly be seen as a result of different divorce regimes. Whereas the first group of countries has limited the entitlement to spousal support through alimonies, the second group has institutionalised extensive entitlements for mothers.

Keywords: first demographic transition, second demographic transition, fertility, individualisation, autonomy, human dignity, childhood, divorce, (legal) divorce regimes.

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1. Introduction

The growing societal importance and valuation of the individual in terms of personal, cultural, social, economic and legal aspects and the associated expansion of individual decision space are key long-term changes across the modern era, and particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries. This development has permeated all areas of society either directly or indirectly – including the family and fertility. Theories focusing on these individualisation processes therefore have an important contribution to make to demographic theory in general and to the explanation of fertility change in particular (see Hirschman 1994, Huinink 2000).\(^1\)

Speaking of individualisation as an overarching change across modernity does not imply the one universal “grand narrative” that has become the target of much well-founded criticism in historical demography (cf. Szreter 2011, in this volume). Individualisation is a multidimensional term (see Kohli 1988, Luckes 2006, Berger and Hitzler 2010), which, in fertility analyses, can refer to all those concerned – women, men and children – as well as to all the institutional arenas in which they live – from family to education, labour market and welfare state. The term can thus be used as an instrument for developing different perspectives on the subject and for telling different “stories”. Individualisation is primarily a framework concept that needs to be defined more specifically, translated from the macro to the micro level, and combined with further arguments and theories.\(^2\) It does not evolve in a linear fashion but through ambivalences, contradictions and conflicts. It does, however, highlight some common features across these domains, providing some welcome theoretical integration in a field at risk of being abandoned to accounts of historical variation or even idiosyncrasy.

Three main aspects of individualisation have been the focus of fertility theories to date. Firstly, autonomy and freedom of choice: In the context of the first demographic transition, this primarily concerned the issue of whether the decline in fertility was the expression of a new modern mentality which enabled couples to make their own decisions about the number of offspring they wanted. Whereas, previously, this kind of family planning had been limited by norms and traditions, for example religious ones, so that it approached a state of “natural fertility” (Henry 1961; Wilson, Oeppen, and Pardoe 1988). Research has since shown that family planning has been practised consistently throughout history (Ehmer 2011, in this volume), which means that the concept

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1 In German sociology similar considerations have been advanced with the term “pluralisation” (e.g. Kaufmann 1995, 96-103). Historical demography has addressed individual emancipation processes and their effects on fertility with respect to gender (see, e.g. Secombe 1992, McDonald 2000, cf. Szreter 2011).

of “natural fertility” is not appropriate for a break separating a pre-modern from a modern era (Szreter 2011). For the second decline in the birth rate which started in the 1960s the issue is the extent to which marriages ended in divorce. Children were mostly born to married parents at this time and the traditional division of work in line with the breadwinner/housewife model depended on a stable marriage. If the increasing divorce rate throws the “contractual” basis of traditional gender roles into question, this must result in a decreasing birth rate (see Davis 1984, 411). This dimension of individualisation – freedom of choice – refers to adults as they decide to continue or not continue their marriage, or to have or not have a (further) child, but not to children themselves as is the case with the other two dimensions.

Secondly, individualisation can be conceptualised as human dignity, which in turn comprises various sub-categories, central among them the right to live, equality independent of origins or other characteristics such as religion or gender, and the capability to live a full life within society (societal participation).3 This last principle results in the necessity of increased investments in the upcoming generations, depending on the current historical standard. Today, for example, a certain degree of education is a key prerequisite for societal participation. This is ensured by compulsory schooling, which was fully implemented in European societies at the turn of the 20th century. This issue relates individualisation theories of fertility to those of family economics such as with the cost of parenting (e.g., Folbre 2008, with her “institutional economics of the family”). In an individualisation framework parental investment is not limited to purely financial factors but also includes love and bonding. This aspect of individualisation refers to parents or adults (for example, with the disappearance of formal or informal marriage bans or the emancipation of women) but also to children.

Thirdly, individualisation may also refer to the idea of individual self-fulfilment (see Luckes 2006, 66-69), an aspect we will consider here in more detail as it is only mentioned briefly in the rest of this paper in reference to the increase in parental investment since the 1960s. It must be mentioned that the three aspects distinguished here are related to one another and that they represent ideal types. This means that freedom of choice is a prerequisite for self-fulfilment; material (instead of merely formal) freedom of choice is itself not unconditional, but is based on education and the possibility of societal participation (empowerment). It is important, however, to distinguish between these dimensions analytically. The wide-spread equation of individualisation with individualism (in the sense of denying all common social values), or even with

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3 The institutionalisation of the so-called “reproductive rights” in the catalogue of human rights should also be mentioned as a component of human dignity. Through these rights, individuals and couples are granted autonomy with their fertility decisions as against encroachments by population policies.
egoism (in the sense of refusing all social responsibility) is a misconception. Autonomy and freedom of choice mean that actions are conceived on the basis of the individual’s interests and values. It is possible to individually opt for commitment, including marriage and remaining with a partner, or for the duties of parenting. While it is true that the institutionalisation of individual autonomy increases the likelihood or risk of diverging from social norms and value traditions, it is also true that decisions made autonomously are more resilient than those made under the pressure of external norms or out of economic imperative (Luhmann 1965).

The difference between autonomy and self-fulfilment may be illustrated through the example of marriage and parenthood. It is often assumed that self-fulfilment goes hand in hand with a lack of commitment and an aversion to long-term responsibility; it follows that marriages would not stabilise because they stand in the path of an individual’s ongoing development and thus parenthood would become unlikely. Autonomy on the other hand means that people have the possibility to terminate unsuccessful marriages; however, they can also opt for the continuation of their marriage if this complies with their needs, desires or moral convictions. Autonomy also means that couples are free to decide to live together without having children; but just as well, they can make a decision to have a child or more children together.

Ron Lesthaeghe (2011, in this volume) explains the decline in the birth rate in the 1960s and the low level of fertility since then as being due to an increasing tendency towards “self-realisation” and “self-actualisation” in the sense mentioned above. In his view, this development is what distinguishes it from the first demographic transition which was characterised by higher parental investment and its consequences (Lesthaeghe 1983, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988). Dirk van de Kaa (1996, 425) neatly summarised this change as “from child-orientedness to self-orientation”. According to Lesthaeghe, self-realisation and self-actualisation have increased in importance since the 1960s because of the growing level of prosperity and security as a result of economic growth and the expansion of the welfare state. Through this, material requirements and interests became less important whereas psychological needs became more important. Lesthaeghe bases his argument on Maslow’s (1954) theory of the hierarchy of needs according to which the basic needs must be met before psychological needs (“higher order needs”, e.g., the need for self-actualisation) can be addressed. He also links his explanation to the work of Ronald Inglehart (e.g. 1977) on value change through the succession of birth cohorts. In his view, because the proportion of people with a traditional mentality is receding and the proportion of people with post-materialist attitudes is increasing, parents are limiting the number of children they choose to have and

4 This is explicated in particular detail in the literature on moral development (Kohlberg 1981; Döbert, Habermas, and Nunner-Winkler 1977).
voluntary childlessness is on the rise. In line with this, a high fertility level is seen as the result of traditional values, social conventions and economic imperatives, which have been left behind in a free modern society (Morgan and King 2001, 8-10). Low birth rates look set to remain in the future: “The decline of fertility to below replacement level is an integral part of the Second Demographic Transition” (van de Kaa 2001a, 3486).

Lesthaeghe’s and van de Kaa’s concepts continue to have wide appeal in sociology and demography, and have given rise to a number of variations. However, there are now several counterarguments to this explanation of the decline in birth rate since the 1960s. The first is that the care and supervision of children can be a form of self-fulfilment in itself (Huinink 2000, 369; see also van de Kaa 2001b). Children are an important medium for reflecting a person’s identity and values and for one’s self-understanding in terms of origin and future. Such a gain for self-reflection and self-knowledge may compensate for the burdens of caring for and committing to the child as it grows up. Parenthood is a lifelong commitment but the period in which parents are significantly restricted by their children is generally limited to the first few years of a child’s life.

Furthermore, from an economic perspective, it may be argued that the increased preference not to have children is the result of increased costs of parenting (e.g. Folbre 2008, 37) and increased insecurity about one’s parental investment (see below). In accordance with this argument, the preference would shift again if changes occurred in this respect. Amongst others, Peter McDonald (2000, 2006) has made this point with regards to women: while women today in Western societies have achieved (or successfully fought for) the same access to education and more equality in the world of work, the reality and day-to-day organisation of families and family policy in many societies are still characterised by a strong orientation towards the traditional gender model. This means that women are forced to make a choice between two contradictory spheres, with the consequence that many opt for an employment career and against children and the opportunity costs that children would entail. On the other hand, some societies – for example, France and Sweden – have diminished the career/family conflict for women and encouraged them to reconcile one with the other through relevant infrastructures and on a symbolic level. The higher fertility rates in France and Sweden contradict this understanding of individualisation because one can not say that these two countries are less individualised than Germany or other countries with very low fertility. The finding of Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari (2009) that across advanced societies fertility is increasing again with rising levels of societal development should also be mentioned here.

And finally, one could find fault with the fact that this argument refutes human nature. From an evolutionary point of view, it must be assumed that most people have a predisposition to reproduce. Although this predisposition varies
in prevalence (Kohler et al. 2006), the theories of evolutionary anthropology and biology oppose the idea that no one or only a few people have a desire to become parents.

These arguments suggest that the significance of the “self-realisation” aspect of individualisation is overestimated in terms of fertility. For this reason, we will now base our discussion of some of the key characteristics and stages in the development of fertility in the 20th century on the two other aspects of individualisation, autonomy and human dignity. What significance do these aspects have, in which ways have they affected fertility and how do they relate to one another?

The following section will examine the first demographic transition, and section 3 and 4 will take a closer look at the second decline in birth rate since the 1960s. The fifth section will address the variation in fertility among countries since the 1970s. This will be followed by a concluding section. We will attempt to gain a synthetic perspective, which, by way of necessity, must be selective and limited to illustrating the steps of our argument via some characteristic findings. Some of the findings refer to Germany (and/or Austria and Switzerland), others are comparative across a wider range of Western countries. The comparison is focused on the countries with higher fertility, specifically, France, Sweden and the US. We will not be able to give a full discussion of the empirical evidence here but we hope to do justice to its basic thrust.

2. The First Demographic Transition

The first demographic transition is often explained via the rising importance of children and the rising investments of parents in their children. This argument is either embedded in a cultural framework – often with reference to Ariès (1962) – or in an economic framework. In terms of both cultural and material aspects, the increasing inclusion of children in education and the prohibition of child labour play a central role. From the perspective of life course theory, such state interventions were the expression of and part of the generalisation of the bourgeois family model, which defines the stage of childhood as characterised by learning and emotional security and not through gainful employment. John Caldwell (1982) neatly summarised the economic effect of this change: As a result of the prohibition on child labour and the enforcement of compulsory schooling, the intra-familial resource flow between parents and children was reversed. If parents are able to use and exploit the manpower of their children, this means that having children results in a material advantage and a higher interest in having many children. In contrast, if the economic advantage of having children is limited or turns into disadvantage, either as a result of the laws mentioned above, or as a result of structural changes in the labour market (demand for increasingly better qualified workers) or of a new social definition of childhood (through the values of individual development and self-
fulfilment), children become cost factors so that resources flow from parent to child. According to Caldwell, this results in the reduction in the number of children or the avoidance of having children altogether. Family economics (e.g. Becker 1981) and the value-of-children approach (e.g. Nauck 2001) also award this argument central significance.5

Caldwell’s definition only partly addresses the historical reality of the first demographic transition. This is because even though the contribution of children to the household income was considerable in some regions and social groups, accounting for over 30% of the income in some cases (see e.g. Zelizer 1985, 58 with extensive references for the US; Weissbach 1989 for France), such “lucrative” labour market conditions were the exception; and also because only a minority of children were engaged in gainful employment at the time of the implementation of these reforms. In the 1900 US census, for example, the proportion of children aged between 10 and 15 engaged in employment was only one sixth. This number underestimates their real economic value because it does not take into account the contribution of child labour on family-run farms, but other estimates also prove the generally limited economic significance of child labour at this time. On the basis of a survey of “Paid employment of children in the home as well as in agriculture and its related industries”, Boentert (2007, 420-1) reports that in the German Empire in 1904, around one in five schoolchildren (up to the age of 14) had worked in agriculture in the past 12 months; however, more than half of them only worked during the harvest season, i.e. over a relatively short time span. Taking into account children who were employed by other households (7%), children in the service industry (just under 10%), in commercial factory work (less than 1%) and in cottage industries (hard to assess), Boentert (2007, 425) estimates a proportion of primary school children engaged in gainful employment of around 20 to 30%. This proportion is not high enough to explain such a sweeping social change as the first demographic transition. One should also consider that the prohibition of child labour and the full implementation of compulsory schooling for children up to the age of 14 occurred at a time when school at-

5 From an economic point of view, it is important to ask whether children, from birth to the time they moved out of the family home, made a positive contribution to the family income in pre-industrial and early industrial society (see Kaplan 1994, Caldwell 2005). This question is difficult to answer empirically. In addition to the age that children started work, the amount of work they performed and their productivity (or the pay they received), other key factors include the time that the young adults left the family home and the levels of resources consumed or contributed by them. Moreover, even if children used more than they contributed financially, it is still possible that they were of instrumental interest to their parents when one considers their key benefit as “insurance” when the parents were no longer able to work, given that modern state provision of health insurance and old-age security only started to be set up at the time of the first demographic transition.
tendance had already achieved high levels in the upper and middle classes as well as in some groups of the working class. However, the figures on the extent of child labour and its contribution to household income do demonstrate that abolishing it represented a major political intervention with significant material consequences for the part of the population that relied on it. These households had taken from them not only an important source of current income but also the insurance benefit associated with income from several sources. As a result of these reforms parenthood became significantly more expensive for these groups, which changed the basis for making fertility decisions. Similarly, families who already had children were plunged into material insecurity; this was one reason why the reforms could only be implemented after a longwinded, hard-fought process (see Cunningham 1995, 105-6, 157-8) where the age limits were gradually set, the permissible duration of work was lowered and industries in which children were permitted to work were restricted. The increased economic productivity from which the workers could also finally benefit at the turn of the 20th century (see Wehler 1995) was a key requirement for the successful implementation of the reforms (see Basu 1999).

How were these state interventions justified? In her analysis of the American discourse that accompanied the reforms, Zelizer (1985, 66-72) showed that proponents of the reforms based their arguments around the child, the love of the child and the concept of a “sacred childhood”. By comparison, their opponents emphasised parental autonomy (“parental rights”), economic interests, the socialising effect of work, or families’ financial dependence on child labour. In Germany, considerations such as the demand of the economy for qualified workers played a lesser role in public discourse.

In comparison to the protection of the physical, mental and moral development of children, the economic effects of a ban on child labour – whether positive or negative – were simply declared irrelevant. In the parliamentary debates of the 1880s it was not even deemed necessary to mention the reasons for a complete ban on child labour in factories: child labour was simply no longer seen as appropriate (see Boentert 2007, 431).

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6 After the end of their compulsory schooling, the majority of young people entered into regular work at the age of 15; they then contributed to the household income until they moved out of the family home (see Jessen 1955), and thus limited the costs of parenthood. This only changed in the 1960s with the expansion of education and the subsequent later entry into the labour market. At the same time it became unusual that an apprentice’s salary should be paid to the parents as board (de Regt 2004).

7 This loss of income was compensated for in part by the increase in women’s employment (see Cunningham 1995, 89). The increase in female employment and the expansion of educational institutions have been used as indicators for the prohibition of child labour and thus for decreasing fertility (see Galloway, Hammel, and Lee 1994, 158).
The newly elevated status of children in the family and in society and its consequences are a key topic of the writings of the Neo-Malthusians with their advocacy of birth control. An example is Robert Michels’ book on *Sexual Ethics* from 1911. Firstly, Michels points out the cost of having children and thus emphasises the necessity of family planning. Other writings and public statements at this period also highlighted the costs of having children instead of their benefits as a possible source of income (see Neuman 1978).

A limitation of the number of the offspring is essential to the economic equilibrium of the family. [...] This applies above all to the poorer classes. If the food supply of a household is barely sufficient for four persons, the increase of the family to eight will result in a definite insufficiency of nutriment. [...] Even in those families which are sufficiently well off to be independent of such consideration for the grosser material needs, the parents must not forget the responsibility that they may incur to their children, and to the descendants of these, by a further sub-division of their patrimony (Michels 1911, 160, our translation).

Importantly, Michels supplements the cost argument with normative and affective aspects and moves away from a perspective that focuses only on the parents. The overall view of the various aspects highlights the extent of parental responsibility towards their children: “... to give life to a human being is so serious a matter that the mere thought of the responsibility thus assumed may well be profoundly alarming” (Michels 1911, 159). The gravity of this responsibility may be a reason not to have children at all if one is not able to meet the expectations linked to parenthood (Michels 1911, 167).

Step by step, Michels develops a complex and modern idea of parenting which approaches Kaufmann’s concept (1995) of “responsible parenthood”. The necessity of limiting the number of offspring is not just a result of the fact that children cause costs and that their basic needs have to be met, or that families with high birth rates have a higher child mortality rate than one-child households. In addition, Michels also points out that “it is evidently far easier to provide a clear-sighted affection and a wisely-conceived and individualised upbringing for two or three children than it is for eight or nine”. However, this should not lead to an “overcultivation” or even suppression of the “precious individuality” of the child (Michels 1911, 162).

The enhanced status of the child, its need for love, adequate parental support and for the acknowledgement of its individuality led to a reassessment of the roles in the family. If parental rights or the rights of the father had hitherto been seen as sacrosanct, they were now to be limited in several ways (see also Engel 2010). Not only was the free usability of the child’s manpower done away with; the sexuality of the *pater familias* was also to be morally limited. To return to Michels once again:

...it is despicable to bring children into the world without having provided guarantees for their loving reception, and without securing the probability that they will have a tolerable existence. This consideration altogether outweighs
that of the possible diminution of pleasure by the use of preventive measures. No father has the right, in pursuit of increased sexual pleasure, to procreate children for whom he will be unable to provide bread. The brief pleasure will be succeeded by long-enduring pain (Michels 1911, 178).

Good material provision by a husband for his wife and children is a key component of the breadwinner/housewife model of the bourgeois family that became more generalised at the turn of the 20th century. The enhanced status of children and the related increases in their costs made contraception an important prerequisite of this model and turned it into a component of masculine respectability (see Praz 2009; Seccombe 1992).

Changes in the position of women in society also contributed to the limitation of male supremacy and to the changes in couples’ fertility strategies. On the one hand, women fought for a life beyond the role of mother and became emancipated from the role of an “engine for procreation” (Gebärmaschine) (Michels 1911, 171; Gumplowicz 1909), which was often ridiculed in the journalism of the era (such as by the satirical magazine Simplizissimus). On the other hand, their sexuality and fertility were regulated by the change in the status of the child as well, which made it impossible for female-headed working class households to have families with many children by making use of their manpower (see Janssens 2007, 48).

How do freedom of choice (autonomy) and human dignity (enhanced status of the person) as two aspects of individualisation relate to one another during the first demographic transition? We have argued that the changes in parental interests that resulted from the enhanced status of children necessitated a more intensive and consistent use of contraception. At the same time, and this was also explicated in Michels’ writings, the enhanced status of the child legitimised a more intensive approach to family planning and led to a greater degree of autonomy for the couple in its fertility decisions. Speaking of changed interests undermines the contrast between “modern fertility behaviour” and a “natural fertility” regime that was asserted by the Princeton European Fertility Project for many years (see Coale and Watkins 1986; Coale 1973, 65) but has since been disproved by historical demography (Szreter 2011).

The enhanced status of the person in general and of the child in particular had various causes. One was the increasing orientation of society towards the here and now; therefore, secular goals such as welfare and quality of life could assume greater importance. Another cause was the diffusion and interpretation of human rights. On a structural level, changes in the employment system and the emergence of modern labour markets that required the existence of and access to free individuals also played a role. Due to the increasing demand for qualifications, higher investments in education became necessary. The individual assumed a higher value and therefore became more worthy of protection; at the same time, this resulted in less productive child labour becoming increasingly superfluous. And finally, the role of the state was important, in the legal
and social implementation of the rights of the individual and the rights of the child as well as in the symbolic policies that celebrated these rights. These factors took effect in different social groups at different times and in different forms; thus, the fact that the decline in fertility during the first demographic transition occurred at different times for different social classes (Kertzer and Hogan 1989; Szreter 1996) can also be reconstructed from the perspective of individualisation theory.

It should again be emphasised that the elevated status of children had an economical and an emotional side. An increasing emotionalisation of parent-child relationships does not mean that these relationships were completely devoid of emotion before the first demographic transition (for a discussion see Becker 2001). Emotions and the bond between parent and child are based in biology (see Hrdy 2000). But these bonds are then anchored with cultural and social values (see Zelizer 1985; Cunningham 1995). Whatever the explanation for the increase in emotionalisation, it is indisputable that this change did occur. Zelizer (1985) speaks of the “sacralisation” of children and childhood. Children also assumed a new utopian potential: By creating “the new person” (den neuen Menschen), a very common concept at that time, it was possible to create a new and better society (e.g. Key 1902). In this respect, teachers and mothers could be seen as revolutionary forces.

3. The Second Demographic Transition

The 1960s saw a renewed elevation in the status of children, which covered legal as well as economic, social and emotional aspects. Similar to the first demographic transition, the rising amount of time spent in formal education played an important role and led to another increase in the cost of parenting.

The change in West Germany is cited here as an example. The mid-1950s saw the initiation of the debate on educational reform. A key protagonist in this process was the German Committee for Education, which was set up as a Federal Commission in 1953 and delivered a large number of recommendations right up to its break-up in 1965. In 1954, for example, it supported the introduction of a ninth compulsory year of schooling at primary level (introduced in 1964), and in 1959 it suggested in its landmark Outline for the Reorganisation and Standardisation of General Education Schooling that the streaming of pupils for the three-tier school system should only take place after the sixth year of school. The tone of the reform debate became more heated when Georg Picht, a member of the Committee until 1963, highlighted the “German education crisis” in a series of articles in Christ und Welt (1964), which had a great impact on public opinion; one year later, he received the Theodor-Heuss-Prize for his contribution to educational policy. Picht primarily supported the modernisation of rural primary school education, which continued to be characterised by single-stage classes (with eight year groups in one class) and separation
along denominational lines; secondly, he wanted to double the number of pupils completing secondary school and thirdly, he supported the proper education of teachers to be able to do this, which entailed the expansion of the universities (Picht 1964, 68).

Parents and their interests played a minor role in Picht’s argument, which had mostly a policy focus on financing opportunities, decision-making and organisational structures, Germany’s position internationally and the significance of education for the modern economy. Parents’ interests are only mentioned once in a short passage:

The educational expectations of pupils and their parents are the same in a village as in a city; our school system therefore penalises the parental rights (Elternrecht), so often quoted in other contexts, if it prevents parents from giving their children the education they need for life (Picht 1964, 38).

Ralf Dahrendorf, who made another key contribution to the debate on educational reform with his book *Education Is a Civil Right: the Plea for an Active Educational Policy* (Dahrendorf 1965a), also avoids addressing the material interests of parents. Just like Picht, the possibility of differing economic interests between parents and children are not brought into the equation, although Dahrendorf continually emphasised the significance of material differences in his writings on social inequality (particularly in his critique of Schlesky’s social levelling hypothesis). In the context of children and education, this does not appear to play a role; here, Dahrendorf views school and family as competing institutions and parental rights as a vehicle for limiting the influence of public concerns – with negative consequences for the modern democratic way of thinking that children need to develop. Children need school in order to learn “social values” and to become responsible citizens (Dahrendorf 1965b). “Education is a civil right” and so additional costs for the parents resulting from prolonged education (even if the state provides free schooling) should not play a role.

In contrast to the tone of the debate on education reform, the general public was well aware of the costs of having children and providing for their education. In 1958, only 52% of West German survey participants over the age of 18 supported the introduction of a ninth year of compulsory schooling at the primary level; 32% were against it and 16% were undecided. 78% of survey participants said they were against a tenth year of compulsory schooling – mainly for the reason that young people would be too old for an apprenticeship after ten years of compulsory schooling, or that being able to earn anything would be delayed for too long (Institut für Demoskopie 1965, 350).

In the 1950s, education for West Germans was still mainly limited to primary school, with only a minority continuing on to secondary school. According to Schimpl-Neimanns (2000, 651), around 14% of 14 to 18-year olds in 1950 attended secondary school or left school with these qualifications; in 1960 this figure was 23%, and in 1970, 35%. The proportion of young people going
on to university also increased significantly in this period. While the proportion of 22-year-olds going on to university was around 2% in 1952, it rose to around 6% by 1966, and after a short temporary decline, doubled by 1973.

Both men and women benefited from this development; however, the gap between the sexes was only really closed in the late 1990s (Lundgreen 2008, 89). In addition to the change in proportions of men and women in education, the rural/urban ratio also changed significantly; rural areas with weaker infrastructure saw a rapid development and thus regional imbalances began to equalise (e.g. Wirtschaft und Statistik 1970, 597-8).

The expansion of education led to a major cultural change for society and for families, and a change in conditions for fertility decisions. The rising costs as a result of the increased proportion of children going on to secondary school were partially offset by the increases in household income; however, the rise in the cost of education could be very high in families with many children because of the rising acceptance of the norm of equality, which meant that parents increasingly treated sons and daughters the same way, and that adopting different strategies of investment in children depending on birth order became less and less legitimate.

It should be added that the educational expansion also influenced fertility via other mechanisms such as the increased age of couples at the time of marriage (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991).

In addition to education, the status of the child was also elevated by the re-definition of its legal position. Triggered by the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child, several rulings by the German Federal Constitutional Court played a key role – particularly the rulings on adoption law and on the legal position of children born out of wedlock. These rulings gave children more independence from their parents, with parental authority being increasingly limited by the well-being of the child. In the ruling on “parental authority” in 1959 (BVerfGE 10, 59; 29 July 1959), which put mothers and fathers on equal terms with regard to their authority in raising children, “paternal authority was declared no longer a right to rule but a right that came with responsibility, a social right which is linked to the duty to ensure the well-being of the child” (BVerfGE 10, 59). In its ruling on the revision of the adoption procedure (BVerfGE 24, 119; 29 July 1968), the Constitutional Court clarified that the issue of a disturbance of family life could not only be assessed from the parent’s point of view because “the child also belongs to the family” (BVerfGE 24, 119). Parents have the right
to care for and raise their children however they wish [...]. However, the protection of this fundamental right may only be considered for actions that could be evaluated as in the interests of the well-being and education of the child, and not the opposite: the neglect of the child. (BVerfGE 24, 119).

The state itself is therefore
not only authorised but obliged to ensure the well-being and education of the child. This obligation of the state does not arise from the legitimate interest of the social community in the education of younger generations [...] or from the general point of view of public policy; it is primarily because the child is also entitled to basic rights and thus has a claim to the protection of the state. The child is a person with his/her own dignity and his/her own right to the development of an individual personality [...] (BVerfGE 24, 119).

These new rulings redefined the position of children born out of wedlock (BVerfGE 25, 167; 29 January 1969) just as foster homes were being reformed and humanised. The threat “If you misbehave, we’ll send you to a home”, which was carried out frequently still in the 1950s and 1960s, lost its power to frighten and finally disappeared altogether (Köster 2003; Wensierski 2006).

Parent/child relationships not only became less hierarchical in the 1960s (see Horkheimer 1936 for a critique of the German family in the 1930s), parents also developed new educational objectives and styles. In addition to the traditional virtues of tidiness, hard work and cleanliness, new individualised goals were adopted that focussed on the autonomy and responsibility of the child (cf. Alwin 1989).

The emotionalisation of the parent/child relationship also continued to intensify (Spree 1992). It had emerged during the first demographic transition (see above), but took on new forms under the growing influence of developmental psychology (e.g. Bowlby 1953). This attracted more attention to the vulnerability of the child and the possibility of lasting psychological repercussions. Parenthood that supplied a continual flow of parental love and material resources was now seen as a prerequisite for good child development.

4. Divorce and Fertility Decline in the 1960s

Increased costs of parenting are a major consequence of individualisation in terms of the elevated status of the child. Their influence on fertility has been widely discussed in the demographic literature – starting with the groundbreaking work on the economics of the family by Gary Becker (1981). Another aspect of individualisation is the improved status of women. This has also been well-documented, be it at the economic and social micro level with reference to the opportunity costs of motherhood, which are increasing with women’s increasing formal education; or at the macro level with reference to the varying speed of progress towards equality in the different institutional fields and the dilemma that arises for women who decide to have children (McDonald 2000, 2006). A further consequence of individualisation has been neglected thus far in fertility research, however, and that is the increasing frequency of divorce. We will take a closer look at this aspect here.

In West Germany, the divorce rate increased rapidly from the mid-1960s and stabilised in the 1980s at a high level, with temporary fluctuations as the
result of specific legal changes or of economic downturns. A similar development could be observed in Austria and Switzerland and in most other developed Western societies. However, there are also significant differences between these countries, for example, the particularly high divorce rates in the US and Sweden and the considerable delay to development in southern Europe and Ireland as a result of the influence of the Catholic Church.

In the course of the surge of individualisation in the 1960s, larger and larger population groups became emancipated from the hitherto restrictive marriage laws that limited divorce, thus enforcing law reforms in the subsequent years. These reforms were, in some respects, catching up on earlier developments (the sudden rapid increase in divorce rates and the subsequent stabilisation is an indicator of the slow pace of reforms up to that point): For one thing, the first ‘modern’ divorce law was adopted in 1792 during the time of the French Revolution (it remained in force until 1815, see Desan 2004); there was also a liberalisation of marriage law in Sweden in 1915, which was adopted in similar forms by the other Scandinavian countries. And for another thing, the concept concerned the transfer of a “basic structural principle” of modern societies to the area of the family, which, up to that point, had been subjected to completely different regulations. In the domains of company and labour law, associations have been characterised by a (relatively) straightforward “exit right” since the beginning of the 19th century. The claim that this could also apply to marriage suggested itself but was in conflict with the traditional legal and social concept of marriage as a lifelong bond. The idea of a freer and more individual model for marriage had already been developed much earlier but it was only in the 1960s that it could replace the conservative model in social and legal terms.

Within a few years, the previously widespread concept of an “unbreakable lifelong bond” had been replaced by a partnership with an exit clause. Since this change, no one now has the certainty that their marriage will last until either their own death or that of their spouse. Research into the causes of divorce has been able to identify specific risk factors (see e.g. Wagner 1997;

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8 In 1965 there were 1.1 divorces per 1,000 inhabitants in West Germany, in 1985 there were 2.3 (German Federal Statistical Office). 10% of the marriages established in 1950 were divorced in the following 25 years; this figure increases to 32% for the marriage cohort of 1980.

9 “Negative freedom of association” is a fundamental right and is protected in Germany by Article 9 of the constitution. The freedom to found an organisation is inseparable from the freedom to leave or not to join an organisation. Transferring this principle to marriage is limited in Germany insofar as the spouses’ freedom of contract (in the marriage contract) is restricted (see Braeuer 2003), and exiting the marriage via divorce has significant legal and financial consequences. If one follows the argument of Hirschman (1974) and transfers it to marriage, it may be the case that the exit option has increased the quality of marriage. Thus, the observation of Nave-Herz (1990) that higher demands on marriages have led to an increase in the divorce rate only refers to one direction of the causal relationship between the two parameters.
Klein and Kopp 1999; Wagner and Weiss 2003), but it cannot be said that the risk of divorce is limited to a few “problem groups”.

How are divorce and fertility related? At the macro level, i.e. aggregate national rates over a period of time, most countries initially show a highly negative correlation with curves that are almost mirror images of one another. However, the relationship of both parameters differentiates itself in the subsequent period (see also Billari and Kohler 2004, 163). While fertility rates went up again in France, Sweden and the US after some time, which seems to indicate that the negative effect of divorce on fertility has declined over the course of time and finally disappeared, divorce in Germany, Austria and Switzerland continues to have a negative effect on fertility; the high divorce level and the low fertility level are stabilising in these countries, in other words, fertility behaviour is not adapting to the new conditions.

At the micro level, three different effects of divorce on fertility have been discussed. The first is the lower fertility after a divorce (as documented by research into the consequences of divorce). This effect can be partially attributed to the lack of a partner or the necessary time for establishing a new partnership, and partially to the lower fertility of second marriages, which is mainly due to the higher age of divorced women (see Klein and Eckhard 2004; Jansen, Wijckmans and van Bavel 2001). Some sub-groups of people remarrying have the opportunity to have an above-average number of children but in general second marriages are associated with lower fertility rates.

The second option for examining this relationship is by looking at research on marriages and couple relationships. As shown by Thornton (1978), for example, fertility decreases within a partnership even before the divorce because the quality of marital interaction has a positive influence on fertility (see also Brüderl et al. 2003) and because reproductive behaviour is influenced by the perceived individual risk of divorce. For the US from 1980 to 1992, Myers (1997, 1281) demonstrated that the perceived risk of divorce particularly reduced the likelihood of having second and third children, while the transition to the first child was not so negatively influenced. This confirmed the results of Lillard and Waite (1993) for the US before 1985. Rijken and Liefbroer (2009) show with data from the Panel Study on Social Integration in the Netherlands (1987, 1991, 1995) that negatively evaluated interactions between spouses significantly lower the likelihood of the birth of a child.

Thirdly, one can discuss the correlation between divorce and fertility by assuming a general anticipatory perspective towards divorce. This means that the relationship quality in a specific marriage and the risk associated with it is less of an impact factor than a general awareness of risk. To adapt one’s actions to perceived risks is surely a well-founded concern in respect of the high investments required by marriage and parenthood. Initially, the awareness of risk related to the provision of financial support for spouses:
The exploding divorce rate struck at the heart of the nineteenth century sex role system. If a young wife could not count on her husband’s remaining married to her, she could not count on his support either. Divorce thus broke the central bargain of marriage by which a woman traded her services as wife and mother for financial support of the husband (Davis 1984, 411).

Now the awareness of risk also applies to parenthood. Stevenson (2007) and Drewianka (2008) showed that the states in the US that have the option of “unilateral exit” demonstrate a negative (if only small) anticipation effect on fertility; according to these studies, the regulation of the division of conjugal property also leads to small differences in reproductive behaviour.

If the risks of divorce are higher for women in general, and particularly as a result of specific aspects of divorce law, this not only lowers fertility but at the same time raises women’s labour market orientation (Stevenson 2007, 2008). This is hardly surprising: research into the consequences of divorce has confirmed Davis’s (1984) view on the disintegration of the traditional gender contract and has shown that women incur heavy financial losses after a divorce if they have occupied the role of housewife in a traditional gender arrangement and were not employed (see e.g. Petersen 1996; Andress 2003; Andress 2009). In this respect, it is safe to assume with Diekmann (1994) that the anticipation of an increased risk of divorce has resulted in higher levels of women in employment (see also BMFSFJ 2005, 218).

This adaptive behaviour is confirmed by the results of the research on the (temporal) process of divorce (cf. Herzer 1998). Johnson and Skinner (1986) observed the employment patterns of married couples from 1969 to 1977 using the data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). They were able to show that female labour force participation increases significantly before a divorce: Three years before the divorce, the proportion of married women in employment was 67%; it then increased to 71% (two years) and 76% (one year), to reach the 85% mark in the year of the divorce (Johnson and Skinner 1986, 457). Multivariate analyses show that the risk of divorce has particularly increased the employment rate of white women with little previous labour market experience (see also Greene and Quester 1982).

In comparison to these early studies, where the risk of divorce was estimated indirectly through socio-structural parameters, the subjective perception of the risk of divorce was directly assessed in the studies by South, Bose and Trent (2004) for the US, and by Beck and Hartmann (1999) for Germany. South, Bose and Trent (2004, 14) reported a significant increase in the number of working hours for women who considered divorce a possibility in their marriage (only those partnerships that still existed at the time of the second survey.

10 In order to determine the influence of women’s employment or of fertility on divorce, the effects in the other causal direction must also be considered (Beck and Hartmann 1999). This also applies to the influence of women’s employment on fertility.
were included in the analysis). If the female respondents estimated the risk as “low” but possible, they showed a significant increase in the number of working hours over those who considered their marriage at “very low” risk of divorce. Beck and Hartmann (1999, 668) show that, in West Germany (but not in East Germany), “suggesting a divorce” or “thinking of marriage difficulties” significantly increased women’s transition into employment.

The increase in divorce rates therefore contributes to the explanation of the fertility decline in the 1960s and 1970s. On the basis of the three approaches outlined (research into consequences of divorce, into marriages and couple relationships, and into anticipation of the general risk of divorce), we may assume an opposite trend as well: that fertility decreases less severely after a divorce because the status of being ‘divorced’ is no longer stigmatised and an active marriage market for second marriages or partnerships has evolved. It also seems to be true that the social normalisation of divorce should lessen the intensity of divorce conflicts between the (ex-)spouses. Research on couple relationships and on the divorce process has documented such adaptation processes and a decrease in the severity of effects. If the stigmatisation effect decreases, spouses will file for divorce more quickly if a marriage is compromised (and thus increase their chances of remarriage); simplified legal procedures should reduce waiting times in divorce proceedings so that less time is lost and a new partnership may be formed more quickly. Finally, from the anticipatory perspective, we may assume an adaptation process and a reduction in the negative effect of divorce on fertility if women are made less vulnerable to divorce through higher employment integration. As a result, men are subjected to less of a financial burden after a divorce.

Female labour force participation has increased dramatically in Europe and the US in the past four decades. In 1970, it amounted to between 45 and 50% for women between the ages of 24 to 55 in West Germany and France (OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics); by 2008 it had increased to around 75% (similar for Austria). In Sweden and the US, these proportions are higher; however, the difference to West Germany declined from around 15 to 20 percentage points in 1970 to around 10 percentage points in 2008.

With regard to the proportion of women in part-time employment, however, there continue to be significant differences between countries. Countries with low fertility rates such as Germany and Austria have seen the proportion of part-time workers increase since 1980, while the countries with higher fertility have seen it decrease (Sweden) or stay the same (France). Part-time work (up to 29 hours/week) accounts for 30 to 40% of employed women in Germany and Austria; while in Sweden the proportion is only around 15%, and in France, around 20% (OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics). The increase in women’s employment in the past few decades has therefore taken different forms (see e.g. Grunow, Hofmeister and Buchholz 2006; BMFSFJ 2005, 51; Drobnic, Blossfeld and Rohwer 1999).
If we compare Sweden and France with Germany and Austria, we may conclude that the lower labour market integration of women in the second two countries is a reflection on the difficulty of reconciling work and motherhood, as Sweden and France both have well-developed and easy-to-access public provision of childcare. The US, however, does not fit this pattern because childcare there is almost exclusively private or commercial as a result of the almost complete lack of any public provision. In order to explain why fertility levels remain high in the US despite this, it is necessary to take into account the conditions on the American labour market (Preston and Hartnett 2008): on the one hand, there is a large low-wage sector, which makes market-based childcare more affordable; on the other hand, it is easier to re-enter or step up employment after taking a break to look after children. There are also cultural differences, in particular the stronger religious orientation of American society. A further dimension of cultural differences is represented by the strength of traditional gender roles (see e.g. Grunow, Hofmeister and Buchholz 2006, 122). This can be seen in the attitudes towards working mothers. In 2000, two thirds of western German 30 to 40-year-olds agreed with the statement that “a young child [...] would definitely suffer if his/her mother is employed” (Kreyenfeld 2002). Part-time work can therefore be seen as a partial modernisation which allows women to fulfil the perceived emotional demands of a child and also the traditional female gender role. However, this comes with the price of lower protection against the financial risks of divorce.

5. The Regulation of Divorce Consequences

Regarding the legal preconditions for exit from marriage – that is, the introduction of unilateral divorce or moving away from the principle of consensus, and the replacement of the at-fault principle with the principle of marriage breakdown (see e.g. Limbach and Willutzi 2002) – there are no longer any major differences between the high and low fertility countries mentioned (see the overview in Kneip and Bauer 2009, 594) that could be used to explain differences in reproductive behaviour. The two groups of countries differ greatly; however, when it comes to the legal consequences of divorce, in line with the findings presented above (see, in particular, Glendon 1989; Verschraegen 2007; Hofer 2003). Until now, this has generally not been addressed outside the sphere of comparative legal studies. While marital solidarity is mostly limited to the duration of the marriage in France, Sweden and the US, this is not the case in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Since the early/mid-1970s, alimony payments after a divorce are usually only guaranteed for a short period and at a

11 Although this argument is often cited, there have only been a few attempts to describe these types sufficiently from an ethnographic point of view (Schütze 1986, Vinken 2007).
low level in the first group of countries; by contrast, in the second group of countries there are legal claims and obligations to provide between the spouses after a divorce which are usually valid for life – except in the case of remarriage.12

How are the two different divorce regimes linked to the different developments in fertility in the two groups of countries? How can the diminished rights for financial support of women in the first group of countries, which may be seen as unfavourable towards women, be reasoned as being to their advantage in the long term and a factor that promotes fertility?

In our view, this change has four effects. The first concerns women’s employment. In the first group of countries (France, Sweden, the US), women with a traditional role (i.e., not employed) have to bear significantly higher costs of divorce than women who are in the labour force; as a result of this risk, this lifestyle is increasingly rare or is only chosen for a limited period. Even women with conservative attitudes are likely to seek employment in order to be able to provide for themselves, so that most women in this group of countries are less vulnerable should divorce occur. This may be seen as a behavioural adaptation that takes into account the increased risk of divorce. The second group of countries does not present such a clear incentive for a change in behaviour, even though it is frequently impossible to secure a traditional lifestyle after a divorce through alimony payments alone, because the economies of scale associated with a shared household no longer apply and the salary of the male breadwinner is too low to fully support two independent households (Andress 2003, 2009; Berghahn 2007).13

The second effect of the divorce regime (as the flipside of the motivation for employment) relates to the vitality of the traditional role of the housewife. Social ideas must have a payout (Lepsius 1986) and institutions depend on resources to maintain their validity. While the traditional role of housewife has

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12 In Germany, the law on alimony payments was changed on 1 January 2008. For all new divorce cases occurring after this date, the period of payment has now also been limited and the recipient’s obligation to gainful work strengthened (see § 1569 German Civil Code [BGB]: Principle of personal responsibility [Grundsatz der Eigenverantwortung]). A central feature of the previous child support law was known as the “age-grade regulation” (Altersgruppenregelung): The courts would set “age grades according to which a child from the age of eight to ten requires personal full-time childcare and therefore assumes no duty of the parent providing childcare to work. Up to this age, child support must be paid in full. After this point, partial employment is expected, the income of which can be added to the child support payments. Only when the child reaches the age of 16 does the expectation of the parent to return to work come into force in full and the claim to child support generally expires” (BVerfG 118, 45, 28 February 2007).

13 In Switzerland there is currently a political debate on how to distribute the resultant risk in cases below the poverty line or social assistance level. While the current regulation puts the risk squarely on the non-earning or lower-earning partner, the minister in charge now proposes to split the risk equally between both partners. This has already resulted in protest from men’s rights organisations.
been consistently devalued or “modernised” in the first group of countries, this has not been the case in the second group where women from the upper middle and upper classes are protected against the financial risks of divorce.\footnote{According to Weitzmann (1992), the US child support reforms of the 1970s targeted this group.} To the extent that this social class embodies and establishes the core values for the rest of society, the traditional role of housewife is still valid here. Childcare at public institutions is seen as damaging and therefore its provision has been neglected.

On a \textit{symbolic level} one can see the divorce regime in the more modern group of countries (France, Sweden, US) as a certain familial reduction in status for children because fewer family resources are invested in them if mothers pursue a career and most of the childcare is left to a crèche or kindergarten. On the one hand, the ‘production’ of children is cheaper for these families because the opportunity costs for mothers are lower and the household income is higher (which reduces the relative cost of having children); on the other hand, the behaviour of women is no longer fully focused on her children who are now in competition with her career goals. In its recent ruling on child support, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) avoided the use of the term “devaluation” and spoke instead of a reconciliation of interests that had become possible because educational research had shown the attendance of crèche and kindergarten as being beneficial to a child’s development: this new regulation with external childcare at a kindergarten and the early return to gainful work for the parent providing childcare has “taken into account not only the parent providing childcare but also the parent responsible for child support, as well as the child, and reconciled these interests with one another” (BVerG 118, 45, 28 February 2007).

The \textit{third} effect of the divorce regime concerns the coherence of state policy. The divorce regime of the more modern group of countries can be seen as the expression and cornerstone of a consistent overall policy direction which has a regulatory effect on labour market and social policy. While policies pursue a clear goal in these countries – the integration of women into the labour market – they remain ambivalent in the second group.

The \textit{fourth} effect concerns men. Divorce not only threatens the interests of women but of men as well. As is the case for women, this is related to the definition of action spaces in terms of traditional gender roles, whereby the woman takes care of the household and raises the children while the man goes to work (e.g. Hausen 1976). Divorce renders this division of roles obsolete: women lack access to the labour market, and men lack access to their children.

Although children are, economically speaking, for most people the most expensive investments (see BMFSFJ 1994, 145) and, psychologically speaking, the most meaningful investments in their lives, there is little information about
how frequently parent/child contact breaks down after a divorce (usually contact to the father). In this respect, men are again the neglected gender in family research (as stated by Tölke and Hank 2005, who do not address this point). According to Hartl (2002), around 50% of West German and around 70% of East German fathers have no or only irregular contact with their children after a divorce (less than at least one contact per month, see also Tazi-Preve 2007). Sometimes it is assumed that men break off contact with their children because they are not able to engage with them without their wife (e.g. Furstenberg and Cherlin 1991, 26, who speak of a “package deal”). Given the high value of children it is more plausible that women act as ‘gatekeepers’ when it comes to regulating contact (see BMFSFJ 2005, 207), preventing their ex-husbands from seeing their children, or even using them as a weapon in the divorce conflict. In countries with a higher labour force participation (France, Sweden and the US, women have fewer incentives to deny their ex-husbands access to their children because their social status does not just come from the fact that they have children (and from other attributes of the housewife role) but also from their own occupational career. In line with this assertion, the proportion of parents in the US breaking off contact with their children has decreased significantly over time (Amato, Meyers and Emery 2009, 47). In Sweden, divorce conflicts occur only rarely (Hobson and Morgan 2002).

With this background, we may ask whether the strength of women and the weakness of men in terms of parent/child contact after a divorce is a reason why the desire for children is lower in men than in women (see Dobritz 2008, 583). For investments to be made, there must be the expectation that they will pay out. This does not just apply to companies but also to families. Fertility decisions are decisions made jointly by women and men (Klein 2003); therefore the risk for fathers of losing the contact with their children after divorce also contributes to the fertility level of a society.

6. Conclusion

Fertility is affected by a wide range of factors, and accordingly, theories of fertility have been developed in several scientific disciplines which examine the issue from different perspectives. Specific theories have therefore only limited scope. Despite this necessary plurality of approaches, we assume that it is possible, using individualisation theory as a parsimonious framework concept, to understand and explain many of the core points of fertility change in Western societies since the end of the 19th century. In doing so, we emphasise two dimensions of individualisation: firstly, the increase in status of the individual – initially of the child, and then also of women – in cultural, social, economic and legal respects; secondly, the increase in autonomy and freedom of choice. In contrast to other approaches based on individualisation theory, we do not use the concept of self-realisation in the sense of an increased orienta-
tion towards purely individual interests, not least because this concept has failed before the renewed rise in fertility that has recently been observed in some advanced societies.

Like many other authors, we have argued that the first fertility decline was a result of the rapid increase in the status of children, which increased the costs of parenting and thus changed the interests of (potential) parents. Because contraception and family planning were already practised before the first demographic transition, as shown by historical demography, this development merely entailed a more intensive and rational use of these practices. In this sense, the increasing autonomy and freedom of choice was less significant than the rise in status of the child.

This simple relationship was also influenced by other factors which may have accelerated or delayed the transition to families with fewer children. Our approach therefore does not claim to explain the full variation in fertility by itself. It should rather be seen as a framework concept that reconstructs the basic changes but must be supplemented by further parameters such as religion, labour market structure or the incipient interventions of the welfare state.

In the second fertility decline since the 1960s, the two dimensions of individualisation had a different causal relationship. As a result of the rapid rises in income, the increased direct costs of having children that resulted from the educational expansion played a less important role for families. In addition to the higher status of the child, the improvement in the status of women and their increasing participation in the educational system were also of major importance. With regard to the dimension of autonomy and freedom of choice, which we see as highly significant for the fertility decline, the new possibility of being able to dissolve a marriage devalued the traditional gender contract of the breadwinner/housewife model, which had an impact on the willingness of women and men to invest in marriage and children.

As outlined above, Western societies took different paths in the 1970s in terms of the legal regulation of the consequences of divorce. While the Scandinavian countries, France and the US strictly limited the entitlements to child support through alimonies, the German-speaking countries institutionalised extensive entitlements for the mother and child in the divorce laws and thus emphasised the significance of the mother-child dyad. This decision led to a dead-end in many respects; the revision of the divorce regime in Germany through the Federal Constitutional Court and through the new law on alimony after divorce has (for the time being) ended this 30-year special path.

From the point of view of these reforms, of women’s increasing labour market orientation and of the incipient labour shortage resulting from the low fertility rates of previous decades, the German-speaking countries look set to follow the course of Sweden, France and the US in the coming years. High divorce rates can go along with high fertility rates if the costs of divorce are low to both men and women. This requires economically independent actors or, in other
words, a higher integration of women into the labour market. On the other hand, the other side of the traditional gender model must also change and men must be secured access to their children in order to make them ready to invest in parenthood. As suggested by the developments in Sweden, France and the US, these two aspects can go hand in hand if the traditional role of housewife assumes a lower significance.

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BVerfG 118, 45 (28.02.2007) – Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Betreuungsunterhalt.


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QUANTUM (Association for Quantification and Methods in Historical and Social Research – Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Quantifizierung und Methoden in der historisch-sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung e.V; founded in 1975) is devoted to the promotion of formal methods, especially of quantitative methods in historical social research. Address: QUANTUM, Liliencronstr. 6, D-50931 Köln, e-mail: zhsf@gesis.org.

INTERQUANT (International Commission of the application of Quantitative Methods in History; founded in 1980 within the International Congress of Historical Sciences) is devoted to the promotion of quantitative methods in the historical sciences on an international level. Address: INTERQUANT, c/o ZHSF, Liliencronstr. 6, 50931 Köln, Germany; e-mail: wilhelm.schroeder@gesis.org.

H-SOZ-U-KULT (H-Net mailing list for diverse subjects of social and cultural history / Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte; founded in 1996) offers a platform for scholarly discussions, announcements and reports on conferences and research projects, reviews, bibliographical information, special inquiries on historiographical subjects etc. Address: H-Soz-u-Kult, c/o Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Institut für Geschichtswissenschaften, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany; e-mail: hsk.redaktion@geschichte.hu-berlin.de; web: http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de.

AFC (Association Française de Cliométrie; founded in 2001) is aimed at re-launching cliometrics in France and abroad, that is to say international research on quantitative history structured by economic theory and using statistical and econometric methods. Address: Claude Diebolt, CNRS, BETA (UMR 7522 du CNRS), Université Louis Pasteur, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire, 67085 STRASBOURG Cedex, France; e-mail: c.diebolt@cournot.u-strasbg.fr; web: http://www.cliometrie.org/.

AGE (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Geschichte und EDV; founded in 1993) is the German branch of the International AHC. Address: Kai Ruffing, Seminar für Alte Geschichte, Universität Marburg, Wilhelm-Röpke-Str. 6C, 35032 Marburg, Germany; e-mail: ruffing@staff.uni-marburg.de; web: http://www.age-net.de.

AHC (International Association for History and Computing; founded in 1986) exists to encourage and maintain interest in the use of computers in all types of historical studies at all levels, in both teaching and research. Address: Hans Jørgen Marker, Danish Data Archive, Islandsøgade 10, 5000 Odense C, Denmark; e-mail: hjm@dda.dk; web: http://odur.let.rug.nl/ahc/.

FQS (Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung – Forum Qualitative Social Research; founded in 1999) is a multilingual online journal for qualitative research. Address: Katja Mruck, FQS; FU Berlin, FB 12, WE 09, Habelschwerdter Allee 45, 14195 Berlin, Germany; e-mail: mruck@zedat.fu-berlin.de; web: http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs/.
HISTORICUM.NET is a scholarly electronic network for history and arts (i.a. thematic portals, electronic journals, reviews). Address: Gudrun Gersmann, Universität zu Köln, Historisches Seminar, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany; e-mail: gudrun.gersmann@uni-koeln.de; web: http://www.historicum.net/

ZOL (Zeitgeschichte-online, founded in 2004) is a central online-portal and gateway which offers resources related to contemporary history. Address: Jürgen Danyel, Zentrum für Zeitgeschichtliche Forschung, Am Neuen Markt 1, 14467 Potsdam, Germany; e-mail: danyel@zeitgeschichte-online.de; web: http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/.

PERSPECTIVIA.NET, founded in 2008, is an international platform for humanities studies. It publishes new texts and book reviews originally online; publications by the institutes abroad so far only available in print will also be retro-digitalised and presented in electronic form with a relevant full-text search capability. Michael Kaiser, c/o Stiftung DGIA, Kronprinzenstrasse 24, 53173 Bonn, Germany, e-mail: Michael.Kaiser@stiftung-dgia.de; web: http://www.perspectivia.net.

JSTOR (ITHAKA) is a non-profit organization dedicated to preserving and increasing access to scholarly journal literature. JSTOR has created a high-quality, interdisciplinary “trusted digital archive for scholarship”. The JSTOR archives include scholarship published in the highest-quality academic journals (incl. the HSR-Journal and the HSR-Supplement, moving wall: two years) across the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, as well as monographs and other materials valuable for academic work. JSTOR has created an electronic archive of the complete back runs of over 1,000 journals in 50 disciplines. More than 6,000 academic institutions and over 700 scholarly publishing organizations around the world participate in this endeavor (since 1995). Online: http://www.jstor.org/

SSOAR (Social Science Open Access Repository / GESIS) offers scholars and scientists from the social sciences and neighbouring disciplines an organisational and technical framework in which they can make their documents electronically available. SSOAR includes HSR-articles from back issues (moving wall: two years). SSOAR is an open-access full-text server; SSOAR’s goal is to implement the “green road” to open access by providing users with free electronic access to journal article preprints and postprints and also to other document types. SSOAR saves, catalogues and archives scholarly and scientific electronic documents from the social sciences. These documents can be either born-digital publications or digitised versions of print works (since 2007). Online: http://www.ssoar.info/en.html
In recognition of “the high quality and relevance to the scientific community” our journal “Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung” has been selected for coverage / archiving in the following databases:

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**SCOPUS** (Elsevier) is the largest abstract and citation database of research literature and quality web sources. It covers peer-reviewed journals from international publishers (Social Sciences: 2,850 titles), including coverage of Open Access journals, Conference Proceedings, Trade Publications and Book Series (since 2004).
Online: [http://www.scopus.com/](http://www.scopus.com/)

**SocINDEX with FULL TEXT** (EBSCO) is the world’s most comprehensive and highest quality sociology research database. It contains abstracts for more than 1,260 “core” (incl. HSR), 500 “priority” and 2,950 “selective” coverage journals. Further, extensive indexing for books/monographs, conference papers, and other nonperiodical content sources is included. Searchable cited references are also provided. It contains full text for 820 journals (incl. HSR, no moving wall).
Online: [http://www.epnet.com/](http://www.epnet.com/)

Online: [http://www.csa.com/](http://www.csa.com/)

**Historical Abstracts** (ABC-CLIO) covers the history of the world (excluding the United States and Canada) from 1450 to the present, featuring coverage of academic historical journals in over 40 languages (since 1955).
Online: [http://www.abc-clio.com/](http://www.abc-clio.com/)

**International Political Science Abstracts** (SAGE) provides non-evaluative abstracts of articles in the field of political science published in journals (and yearbooks) all over the world (since 1951).
Print: [http://www.sagepub.co.uk](http://www.sagepub.co.uk)

**Social Research Methodology Database** (SAGE / NIWI) provides references to literature on social and behavioral research methodology, statistical analysis, and computer software. Covers international periodicals, readers, research reports, congress proceedings, and books (since 1970).
Online: [http://www.srm-online.nl/index.htm](http://www.srm-online.nl/index.htm)

**SOLIS** (Social Science Literature Information System / GESIS) provides references to German social science literature – journal articles, contributions in compilations, monographs, and grey literature (since 1977).